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JUDGE OVER JURY: FLORIDA'S PRACTICE OF IMPOSING
DEATH OVER LIFE IN CAPITAL CASES
MICHAEL MELLO* AND RUTHANN RoBSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
Where a jury and a trial judge reach contrary conclusions be-
cause the facts derive from conflicting evidence, or where they
have struck a different balance between aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances which both have been given an opportunity
to evaluate, the jury recommendation should be followed be-
cause that body has been assigned by history and statute the
responsibility to discern truth and mete out justice. Given that
the imposition of a death penalty "is not a mere counting pro-
cess of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of
mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment ...,"
both our Anglo-American jurisprudence and Florida's death
penalty statute favor the judgment of jurors over that of
jurists.1
[W]hen juries differ with the result at which the judge would
have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the
very purposes for which they were created and for which they
are now employed.2
On September 7, 1984, Ernest Dobbert became the first person
since the modem resumption of capital punishment- to be exe-
* Assistant Public Defender, Capital Appeals Division, West Palm Beach, Florida. Mary
Washington College, B.A., 1979; University of Virginia, J.D., 1982. The author was co-coun-
sel for Joseph Spaziano in Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984), where the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Florida's jury override in capital cases. On April 24,
1985, the author testified in support of Fla. SB 940 before the Senate Judiciary-Criminal
Committee. See infra note 76. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors
and not of the Office of the Public Defender.
** Attorney, Florida Rural Legal Services. Ramapo College, B.A., 1976; Stetson Univer-
sity, J.D., 1979.
1. Chambers v. State, 339 So. 2d 204, 208-09 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973)).
2. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
3. There was a 10 year moratorium on executions in the United States between 1967 and
1977, during the time that the constitutionality of capital punishment was being tested in
the courts. See generally M. MELTsNNA CRuEL AND UNUSUAL (1973). The United States Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of the dealth penalty in July of 1976. See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976). Gary Gilmore was executed six months later. See generally N. MAUXR, THE
ExEctmoNzR's SONG (1979). See also infra note 12.
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cuted 4 notwithstanding the fact that the jury in his case, by a vote
of ten to two, had decided that Dobbert should live.8 Two months
earlier, in Spaziano v. Florida,' the United States Supreme Court
had held that a state trial court may, consistent with the Constitu-
tion, impose a sentence of death despite a jury's conclusion that
the defendant deserved to live.
Florida is one of only three states which allows a judge to over-
ride a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. Florida is the
only state which employs the override frequently, despite the fact
that Florida juries are among the most death-prone.8 As of Decem-
4. Dobbert v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 34 (1984) (denying application for stay of
execution).
5. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 287 (1977).
6. 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
7. Of the 37 states with capital punishment statutes, 30 "give the life-or-death decision
to the jury, with only 3 of the remaining 7 allowing a judge to overrule a jury's recommenda-
tion of life." Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3164 (footnote omitted). Twenty-nine states require a
jury to find that the defendant deserves to die. One state, Nevada, provides for jury capital
sentencing, but if the jury cannot agree a panel of three judges decides sentence. Id. at 3164
n.9. Four states provide for judge sentencing in capital cases without input from a jury. Id.
Only three states, Florida, Alabama, and Indiana, permit a judge to disregard a sentencing
jury's recommendation in favor of life. Id. Only in Florida is the override used frequently.
See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, American legislatures have decided with near unanim-
ity that no person should be sentenced to die without the consent of his peers. Prior to
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), "[elxcept for four States that entirely abolished
capital punishment in the middle of the lest century, every American jurisdiction has at
some time authorized jury sentencing in capital cases." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 200 n.11 (1971). The plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
traced this history
The inadequacy of distinguishing between murderers solely on the basis of legis-
lative criteria narrowing the definition of the capital offense led the States to
grant juries sentencing discretion in capital cases. Tennessee in 1838, followed by
Alabama in 1841, and Louisiana in 1846, were the first States to abandon
mandatory death sentences in favor of discretionary death penalty statutes. This
flexibility remedied the harshness of mandatory statutes by permitting the jury to
respond to mitigating factors by withholding the death penalty .... By 1963, all
... jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty statutes with discre-
tionary jury sentencing.
Id. at 291-92 (footnotes omitted). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598-99 (1978); W.
BowERS, ExEctrlIONS IN AMERIcA 7-9 (1974).
8. Twenty-three states explicitly require jury unanimity to impose death, and most of
the remaining states do so by implication. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L
Rav. 1, 102-19 (1980). In Florida, a death recommendation only requires a majority of the
jury. FL& STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983).
The United States Supreme Court's recent modification of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968) will further stack the deck against defendants facing the death penalty. The
Court in Witherspoon held that a prospective juror who expressed reservations about capi-
tal punishment could be excluded for cause only if she made it "unmistakably clear" that
she would automatically vote against the death penalty. Id. at 522 n.21. The recent decision
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ber 11, 1984 life overrides had occurred eighty-seven times in Flor-
ida,9 as compared to twice in Indiana 0 and six times in Alabama.11
Because of these numbers, Florida is the only state with an exten-
sive and refined body of override law.12 More importantly, Florida
in Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985) permits a juror to be excluded for cause if his
views on the death penalty "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror. . . ." Id. at 857 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
9. See Post-Furman Death Sentences in Florida (unpublished compilation prepared by
Capital Punishment Project, University of Florida, Department of Sociology, Michael
Radelet, Director) (undated). There have been 376 death sentences imposed as of Septem-
ber 20, 1984. Thus, life overrides are fully one-quarter of Florida's death penalty problem.
Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C.D. L
REv. - (1985) (unpublished manuscript, Feb. 15, 1985), at 4-5. These figures suggest that
"[r]epeal of judges' power to override jury recommendations of life would clearly help the
Supreme Court workload.... The statistics suggest that eliminating judges' power to over-
ride jury recommendations of life would reduce the Florida Supreme Court's capital
caseload by 25 percent." Skene, Judges, not juries, have last say on death sentences in
Florida, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at 1-A, col 1. Cf. Borgognoni & Keane, Prac-
tice Before the Supreme Court of Florida: A Practical Analysis, 8 STETSON I. REV. 318, 329
(1979).
10. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the jury override in Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d
1047 (Ind. 1983). The second case, Thompson v. State, No. 882-s303 (Ind, transferred Mar.
22, 1985), is currently awaiting decision in that court..
11. The six cases in which an override has resulted in a death sentence are Murry v.
State, 455 So. 2d 53 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd, 455 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 1984); Jones v. State
456 So. 2d 366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), aff'd, 456 So. 2d 380 (Ala. 1984); Lindsey v. State,
456 So. 2d 383 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), afld, 456 So. 2d 393 (Ala 1984); Crowe v. State, 453
So. 2d 6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) appeal pending, No. 84-399 (Ala. argued Jue 10, 1985);
Harrell v. State 456 So. 2d 1170 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) afrd, No. 83-1287 (Ala. Mar. 15,
1985); and Neeley v. State, 7 Div. 145 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 12, 1985) petition for cert.
filed, No. 84-872 (Ala. May 25, 1985).
Two Alabama cases in which an override has resulted in a life sentence are Johnson v.
State, 6 Div. 59 (pending, Ala. Crim. App.) and Kinder v. State, 6 Div. 633 (pending, Ala.
Crim. App.). See Letter from Ed Carnes, Assistant Alabama Attorney General, to Michael
Radelet (Nov. 29, 1984) (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
12. This is true, in part, because of Florida's enthusiasm for the death penalty generally.
As of December 20, 1984, Florida's death row held 223 men, the most populous of any state.
DEATH Row USA., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FuND, INc., at 7-8 (Dec. 20,
1984). Twenty-one people were executed in the United States in 1984. Eight of these were
executed in Florida (Anthony Antone, Arthur Goode, James Adams, Carl Shriner, David
Washington, Ernest Dobbert, James Henry, and Timothy Palmes), five in Louisiana
(Johnny Taylor, Elmo Sonier, Timothy Baldwin, Robert Willie, and Ernest Knighten), three
in Texas (Thomas Barefoot, James Autry, and Ronald O'Bryan), two in Georgia (Ivon Stan-
ley and Alpha Stephens), two in North Carolina (Velma Barfield and James Hutchins) and
one in Virginia (Linwood Briley). In 1983, Robert Sullivan was executed in Florida, John
Evans in Alabama, Jimmie Gray in Mississippi, Robert Williams in Louisiana, and John
Smith in Georgia. In 1982, Frank Coppola was executed in Virginia and Charles Brooks was
executed in Texas; in 1981, Steven Judy was executed in Indiana; in 1979 John Spinkelink
was executed in Florida; in 1978, Jesse Bishop was executed in Nevada; in 1977 Gary Gil-
more was executed in Utah. Id. at 3. The eleven executions that occurred between 1977 and
1983 are examined in Streib, Executions Under the Post-Furman Capital Punishment
Statutes: The Halting Progression From "Let's Do It" to "Hey, There Ain't No Point In
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is the only state that has actually executed a person despite the
jury's recommendation of a life sentence, and it is likely to con-
tinue doing so.
Spaziano is the most recent example of the United States Su-
preme Court's "unwilling[ness] to say that there is any one right
way for a State to set up its capital-sentencing scheme."13 After a
decade of agony and fragmentation on the Court, a fairly stable
consensus seems to have emerged among the Justices:14 that the
Pulling So Tight," 15 RUTGERS LJ. 443 (1984).
13. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3165 (citing Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct 871 (1984)); accord
California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. CL 2733, 2747 (1983);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
14. Between 1971 and 1980, except for routine applications of Witherspoon v. Illinois,
390 U.S. 510 (1968), only five capital opinions were supported by a majority of the Court.
"The important ones have been decided by pluralities of three or four." Gillers, supra note
8, at 9; see also id. at nn.32 & 33. The Court rendered four capital decisions in the 1982
Term, all of which were against the inmates: Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (6-3
decision); Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) (6-3 decision); California v. Ramos, 103
S. Ct. 3446 (1983) (5-4 decision); Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983) (7-2 decision).
"The most striking fact of [these] four important cases is that the Court upheld death
sentences. In the previous seven years, since the Court 'restored' the death penalty in Gregg
(v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)] in all but one of the fifteen fully argued capital punishment
cases decided on the merits it had vacated or reversed the death sentence." Weisberg, De-
regulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 305 n1. -
This pattern remained constant throughout the 1983 Term as well. In three of the four
capital cases decided, the Court ruled against the death-sentenced inmate. See Spaziano v.
Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984) (6-3 decision); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984) (7-2 decision); Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984) (7-2 decision). In Arizona v.
Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984), the Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's vacation of
the death sentence on the basis of double jeopardy where a previous conviction resulting in
a life sentence had been set aside. But in doing so, the Court did no more than refuse to
overrule it's earlier holding in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), and two Justices
dissented even from this modest holding. Id. at 2311 (Rehnquist and White, JJ., dissenting.)
At this writing, only two capital cases have been decided during the 1984 Term: Wain-
wright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985), decided by a 6-3 vote against the death row inmate,
and Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), decided 8-1 in favor of the defendant.
Commentators have noted the Court's increasing impatience'with challenges to capital
sentences. See, e.g., Devine, Feldman, Giles-Klein, Ingram & Williams, Special Project: The
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in New Jersey, 15 RuTGES L.J. 261, 303-10 (1984).
Perhaps the best example of this is the Supreme Court's abrupt treatment of successive
habeas petitions. See, e.g., Antone v. Dugger, 104 S. Ct. 962, 964-65 (1984); Woodard v.
Hutchins, 104 S. Ct. 752 (1984); Gray v. Lucas, 104 S. Ct. 211, 212-13 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). The Court has been willing to grant temporary stays of execution for death row
inmates raising issues that would be controlled by cases then pending before the Court. See,
e.g., Barfield v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 3570 (1984); McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 104 S. Ct. 2383
(1984); Autry v. Estelle, 104 S. Ct. 24 (1983) (White, J., sitting as Circuit Justice). The
strangest of these was the Georgia case of Alpha Stephens. Stephens argued, in a successive
habeas petition, that the death penalty in Georgia was being applied in a racist manner, an
issue then pending before the en banc Eleventh Circuit in Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562,
1578 (11th Cir.), vacated pending reh'g en banc, 715 F.2d 1583 (11th Cir. 1983), en bane
decision withheld, 729 F.2d 1293,1294 (11th Cir. 1984) and McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp.
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Court should be "going out of the business of telling the states how
to administer the death penalty."16 So long as a state has a statute
which demarks a "class of death-eligible murderers smaller than
the class of all murderers,"1 so long as the sentencer retains dis-
cretion (guided by the objective formulae), and so long as the de-
fendant has a "fairly broad opportunity to make a case for mitiga-
tion,"17 the Court will not interfere.
This Article explores the legislative question which remains after
Spaziano: As a matter of wise public policy, should Florida repeal
its jury override? The next section of the Article presents a general
survey of the override as defined by the capital statute and as con-
strued by the Florida Supreme Court. The following section dis-
cusses the Spaziano case. The remaining sections explore the pol-
icy considerations militating against retention of a judge's power to
override a jury's recommendation of life, several of which are pecu-
liarly legislative, as opposed to judicial, concerns.
H. FLORIDA'S JURY OVERRIDE
Florida's present day capital punishment statute was enacted in
1972 in the wake of Furman v. Georgia.15 In Furman, a sharply
divided Supreme Court held that the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause of the eighth amendment prohibited imposition of
the death penalty pursuant to statutes, such as Florida's, which
allowed juries uncontrolled discretion to impose death. Under the
Florida statutes, unconstitutional after Furman,1' all defendants
338 (N.D. Ga. 1984), hearing en banc granted sub nom, McCleskey v. Kemp, 729 F.2d 1293,
1294 (11th Cir. 1984), affd en banc, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed,
No. 84-6811 (U.S. May 28, 1985). A panel of the Eleventh Circuit denied Stephens a stay
based on the successive nature of his petition, Stephens v. Kemp, 721 F.2d 1300 (11th Cir.
1983), and the en banc court, by an equally divided vote, also denied a stay. Stephens v.
Kemp, 722 F.2d 627, 628 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc). The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote and
despite a biting dissent, granted a stay pending the Eleventh Circuit's resolution of Spencer
and McCleskey. Stephens v. Kemp, 104 S. Ct. 562 (1983). A year later, with Spencer and
McCleskey still pending before the en banc Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court, 5-4, dis-
solved the stay in Stephens without opinion. Stephens v. Kemp, 105 S. Ct. 530 (1984).
Three weeks later, Alpha Stephens was executed, with Spencer and McCleskey still pending
in the Eleventh Circuit.
15. Weisberg, supra note 14, at 305 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 358.
17. Id.
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. FL& STAT. §§ 775.082(1), 921.141 (1971). Furman rendered these statutes unconstitu-
tional. See, e.g., Pitts v. Wainwright, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Anderson v. Florida, 408 U.S. 938
(1972); Newman v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331
(Fla. 1972); Reed v. State, 267 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1972); Chaney v. State, 267 So. 2d 65 (Fla.
1985]
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convicted of a capital offense were to be sentenced to death, unless
the jury recommended mercy.20 A jury recommendation of mercy
was binding on the trial court. The statute made no attempt to
define, limit, or guide the jury's process of deciding whether or not
to recommend mercy.
Florida's post-Furman statute21 attempted to guide the capital
punishment decision by establishing a procedure to be followed in
determining what penalty should be imposed upon a conviction for
first degree murder. The statute provides that the court shall, un-
less waived, conduct a separate sentencing proceeding before the
jury.22 This proceeding constitutes a trial on the issue of penalty,
and many trial procedures have been imported into the penalty
phase.2" The statute provides that evidence probative of sentence
may be presented "regardless of its admissibility under the exclu-
sionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. '24 The statute enu-
merates aggravating and mitigating circumstances to guide the jury
in its deliberations.2 5 The jury then renders an "advisory sentence
to the court. '26
The statutory language is clear that the jury's recommendation
is not binding: "Notwithstanding the recommendation of a major-
ity of the jury, the court after weighing the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances" enters a sentence of life or death. If the
sentence is death, or if the judge imposes a life sentence despite
the jury's recommendation of death, the court must set forth in
writing its findings as to the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances.28 Death sentences are subject to automatic review by the
1972).
20. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1971).
21. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1983). In addition to authorizing death for aggravated murder,
the statute also permitted the death penalty for rape of a child under the age of 11. The
Florida Supreme Court held the latter provision unconstitutional in Buford v. State, 403 So.
2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
22. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1983).
23. See, e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
508 (1983).
24. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1983).
25. Id. §§ 921.141(2), (5)-(6).
26. Id. § 921.141(2). Although the statute speaks in terms of a recommendation by a
"majority" of the jury, a split vote of 6-6 is treated as a recommendation of life imprison-
ment. See Patten v. State, 467 So. 2d 975, 979 (Fla. 1985); Rose v. State, 425 So. 2d. 521,
525 (Fla.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983).
27. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983).
28. The statute requires written findings if the judge imposes death, regardless of
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Florida Supreme Court.29
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of
its post-Furman capital punishment statute, including the jury
override, in the 1973 case of State v. Dixon.30 Applying reasoning
that seems ironic in light of the subsequent frequency of death
sentences imposed following jury recommendations of life impris-
onment, the court explained that "[tjo a layman, no capital crime
might appear to be less than heinous ... . ., 1 Trial judges, "with
experience in the facts of criminality [possess] the requisite knowl-
edge to balance the facts of the case against. . . standard criminal
activity .... .3 2 Such knowledge "can only be developed by in-
volvement with the trials of numerous defendants." 3 In this way
"the inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer sentence a man to
die; the sentence is viewed in the light of judicial experience.""M
The United States Supreme Court, in Proffitt v. Florida,"6 held
that Florida's new death statute sufficiently guided the sentencer's
discretion and satisfied the concerns articulated in Furman. The
death-sentenced petitioner in Proffitt, whose jury had recom-
mended death, 6 argued to the Court that "[tihe jury's advisory
sentencing verdict introduces unnecessary discretion into the sen-
tencing procedure because the statute gives no guidance regarding
its relevance. The verdict is merely an enigmatic statement that
the jury recommended life or death. The basis for the recommen-
dation need not be given." 37 The Supreme Court did not agree
that the override injected arbitrary discretion into Florida's capital
punishment scheme. The Court relied upon and quoted from a
whether the jury recommended life or death. Id. § 921.141(3). The Florida Supreme Court
has required, pursuant to its power to regulate practice and procedure, that judges imposing
life sentences where the jury has recommended death must also support the sentence by
written findings. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943
(1974).
29. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1983). See Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose
Death, 68 GEo. LJ. 97, 123-141 (1981); Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court
and Death Penalty Appeals, 74 J. Cnm. L & CmiMNOLOGY 913 (1983). See generally D.
PArmcK, JuDicuL Rvmw oF m DATH PwNs.TY (1982); Goodpaster, Judicial Review of
Death Sentences, 74 J. Cma L & CWMINOLOGY 786 (1983).
30. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
36. Id. at 246.
37. Brief of Petitioner at 63-64, Proffltt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See also Brief
for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicua Curiae at 37-40, 46-47.
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Florida Supreme Court case holding that "in order to sustain a
sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts
suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing
that virtually no reasonable person could differ."38
The Florida case relied upon by the United States Supreme
Court was Tedder v. State,"9 and the "virtually no reasonable per-
son could differ" standard of Tedder has become the cornerstone
of the Florida Supreme Court's override doctrine. 40 As articulated
in Tedder itself, the Florida override standard focuses on aggravat-
ing circumstances as the reasons for imposing death: "[Tihe facts
suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing
that virtually no reasonable person could differ."'41
More recent cases make clear that the Tedder standard applies
equally to the mitigation side of the sentencing equation. The
court in Thomas v. State2 explained that "[w]here there are one
or more aggravating circumstances and the trial judge has found
no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances, application of the Tedder rule calls for inquiry into
whether there was some reasonable ground for a life sentence that
might have influenced the jury to make such a recommendation." 43
And the court concluded that "[w]here the jury recommendation is
not based on some 'valid mitigating factor discernible from the rec-
ord' the Tedder standard for a jury override is met."4" That the
38. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
39. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1976).
40. It is fair to say that "Ii]n the years since (Tedder was decided, the court has] not
wavered from the Tedder test and [has] consistently applied it to the facts and circum-
stances of cases on review where the trial judge has overridden a jury recommendation of
life imprisonment and imposed the death penalty." Thompson v. State, 456 So. 2d 444, 447
(Fla. 1984). Though the court occassionally uses what apparently is shorthand in expressing
the Tedder test, see e.g., Barfield v. State, 402 So. 2d 377, 382 (Fla. 1981); Neary v. State,
384 So. 2d 881, 885 (Fla. 1980); Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 1977), and some-
times does not cite Tedder when considering an override case, see Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250
n.7, the vast majority of the cases quote and apply Tedder.
By contrast, in Alabama the trial judge need only "consider" the jury's sentencing recom-
mendation. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1981); Jones v. State, 456 So. 2d 380 (Ala. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1779 (1985); Jones v. Alabama, 105 S. Ct 1779 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Even this much may not be required. See Baldwin v.
Alabama, No. 84-5743, 53 U.S.L.W. 4759 (U.S. June 17, 1985). The Indiana statute contains
a substantively identical provision. IND. Con ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e)(2) (Burns 1985).
41. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910 (emphasis added).
42. 456 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1984).
43. Id. at 460. See also Richardson v. State, 437 So. 2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 1983) (jury's
advisory verdict should not be overruled "unless no reasonable basis exists for the
opinion").
44. Thomas, 456 So. 2d at 460 (quoting Lusk v State, 446 So. 2d 1038, 1043 (Fl. 1984)).
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Florida Supreme Court gives full weight to the jury's consideration
of possible mitigation is also suggested by Lusk v. State,5 where
the court systematically applied Tedder first to the aggravating
circumstances and then to the asserted mitigating circumstances. 46
The court has also recently held that a life recommendation may
be reasonable (and thus not subject to the override) even if based
on mitigating circumstances not enumerated in the capital
statute.'7
The Tedder standard has been applied io affirm a judge's over-
ride of a jury's recommendation of life where "some matter not
reasonably related to a valid ground of mitigation has swayed the
jury to recommend life, such as through emotional appeal,
prejudice, or [something of] similar impact .... Several Flor-
ida Supreme Court cases state that a sentencing judge may con-
sider, in aggravation, information not presented to the advisory
45. 446 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1984).
46. Id. at 1043. See also Thompson, 456 So. 2d at 447-48. One commentator has argued
that "[plotentially mitigating conditions have figured prominently in the [Florida Supreme
Court's) appellate review analysis only when the appellate court found insufficient grounds
for the trial court's overruling a jury's recommendation of leniency." Dix, supra note 29, at
129.
47. Herzog v. State, 439 So. 2d 1372, 1381 (Fla. 1983); Wishington v. State, 432 So. 2d
44, 48 (Fla. 1983); Gilvin v. State, 418 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1982); Welty v. State, 402 So. 2d
1159, 1164-65 (Fla. 1981); Lewis v. State, 398 So. 2d 432, 438-39 (FUn. 1981); Jacobs v. State,
396 So. 2d 713, 717-18 (Fla. 1981). For a two year period, beginning with Cooper v. State,
336 So. 2d 1133, 1139 & n.7 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977), the law of Florida
restricted the capital sentencer's consideration to those mitigating factors listed in the stat-
ute. The Florida Supreme Court ended this restriction in 1978 after the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See Songer v. State, 365 So.
2d 696, 700 (Fla. 1978). The constitutional impact of this limitation is presently pending
before the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Hitchcock v.
Wainwright, 745 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1984); id. at 1342-44 (Johnson, J., dissenting), vacated
pending reh'g en bane, 745 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1985); Songer v. Wainwright, 755 F.2d 1394
(11th Cir.), vacated pending rehg en bane, 756 F.2d 799 (11th Cir. 1985); Songer v. Wain-
wright, 756 F.2d 800 (11th Cir.), vacated pending reh'g en banc, 756 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir.
1985). See generally Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death- Lockett v.
Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69
CALr. L. Rzv. 317, 351-355 (1981). The Eleventh Circuit heard oral arguments in Songer
and Hitchcock on June 10, 1985.
48. Thomas, 456 So. 2d at 460; see also Porter v. State, 429 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla.) ("de-
fense counsel's reading of an 'extremely vivid and lurid' description of an electrocution...
might well have been calculated to influence the recommendation of a life sentence through
emotional appeal"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983); Bolander v. State, 422 So. 2d 833,
837 (Fla. 1982) (improper for jury to base life recommendation on status of victims as drug
dealers), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 939 (1983); McCrae v. State, 395 So. 2d 1145, 1154-55 (FIU)
(jury improperly found mitigating circumstance that defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of crime), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1041
(1981).
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jury,49 while language in other cases is to the contrary.50 The court
has also affirmed overrides based on its duty to ensure relative pro-
portionality among comparable capital cases.51 In Barclay v.
State52 and Miller v. State,5 for example, the court upheld jury
overrides because equally culpable codefendants had properly been
sentenced to death.5
This body of override case law developed during the decade
since Furman. On January 9, 1984, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari55 to consider specifically whether the over-
ride aspect of Florida's statute violated the Constitution."
49. In Engle v. State, 438 So. 2d 803, 813 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1430
(1984), the court in deciding whether to follow a jury recommendation reasoned that "a trial
judge may consider information, such as presentence and psychological reports, which were
not considered by the jury during its sentencing deliberations." See also Porter, 429 So. 2d
at 296; Smith v. State, 403 So. 2d 933, 935 (Fla. 1981); White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331, 339-40
(Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3571 (1983).
50. The court has said that it "cannot condone a proceeding which, even subtly, detracts
from comprehensive consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors [by the jury]."
Richardson, 437 So. 2d at 1095. In Richardson, the trial judge had overridden the jury's life
recommendation because the jury "did not have the benefit of all of the evidence. . . ." Id.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the override because it could not "countenance the
denigration of the jury's role implicit in these comments." Id. See also Chambers v. State,
339 So. 2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring). Cf. Miller v. State, 332 So. 2d 65,
68 (Fla. 1976) (rejecting trial judge's reasoning that he could consider mitigating evidence
not available to jury); Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137, 142 (Fla. 1976) (same), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 984 (1981).
51. The concern about proportionality is reflected in situations where different juries
hold equally culpable defendants guilty, yet one jury returns a life sentence while the other
recommends death. The Florida Supreme Court's mandatory review of capital cases is
designed in part to assure consistency among cases. See, e.g., Menendez v. State, 419 So. 2d
312, 315 (Fla. 1982); Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1000 (1981); Sater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d
1, 10 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
52. 343 So. 2d 1266, 1271 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978). The Florida
Supreme Court later reconsidered its disposition of Barclay's direct appeal, finding that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel on his direct appeal. Barclay v. Wainwright,
444 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1984). Ultimately, the court decided that the jury override had been
improper in Barclay's case. Barclay v. State, 10 Fla. L.W. 299 (Fla. May 30, 1985).
53. 415 So. 2d 1262, 1263-64 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1158 (1983).
54. See also Eutzy v. State, 458 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 105 U.S. 2062
(1985); Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133, 137 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1690
(1984); McCray v. State, 416 So. 2d 804, 808 (Fla. 1982); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 954
(Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Malloy v. State, 382 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (Fla.
1979).
55. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 697 (1984).
56. Prior to Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984), the Court had suggested that the
power of a Florida judge to override a jury's life recommendation was constitutional. See
Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983); id. at 3428 (Stevens, J., concurring); Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294-96 (1977); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976). But the
issue was not presented or briefed in any of those cases. In Proffitt, both the judge and the
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III. Spaziano v. Florida
Joseph Robert Spaziano was convicted in the Circuit Court of
Seminole County, Florida of first degree murder. Following a pen-
alty phase proceeding, a majority of the jury recommended a life
sentence.8 The judge rejected this recommendation and imposed
the death sentence, finding two aggravating circumstances: that
the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,58 and that the
defendant had previously been convicted of felonies involving the
use or threat of violence.5 9 On automatic appeal, the Florida Su-
preme Court affirmed the conviction, 0 but remanded for resen-
tencing because the trial judge had improperly considered a confi-
dential presentencing report."1 The court remanded only for the
trial court's reconsideration of sentence; a new advisory jury was
not impaneled.
The trial judge again sentenced Spaziano to death, finding the
same two aggravating circumstances he had found earlier. In deter-
jury agreed that death was the appropriate punishment. Id. at 246. Indeed, the State of
Florida in.Proffitt "invite[d] the Court's attention to the fact that both the jury and the
judge in this case recommended Petitioner be-sentenced to death. ... [Wie are not con-
fronted with an overriding of a recommendation of mercy, but rather unanimity as between
the jury and the trial judge. ." Brief of Respondent at 77-78, Profflitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976). The sole issue was whether the imposition of death in any case under the Florida
statute violated the Consitution. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 245; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
202 n.51 (1976) (noting the "limited grant of certiorari" in the five 1976 death cases, includ-
ing Proffitt).
In Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 284 (1977), the grant of certiorari was also limited
and did not include this issue. The Court held only that, given the presumed protections of
Tedder, "defendants are not significantly disadvantaged vis-a-vis ... the old statute" for
purposes of the ex post facto clause. Id. at 296. See also infra notes 143-44 and accompany-
ing text. In reaching the issue of the judge's consideration of nonstatutory aggravating cir-
cumstances in Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3420 (1983), the Court presumed but did
not discuss the constitutionality of the override procedure. See also id. at 3428 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
The majority in Spaziano did not treat Proffitt, Dobbert, and Barclay as having resolved
the override's constitutionality. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Spaziano, noted: "[M]y
description of Proffitt as containing a holding on this point in Barclay v. Florida... was
incorrect." Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3168 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations ommitted).
57. The defense and the prosecutor at trial stipulated that the jury not be polled. Spazi-
ano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3158 n.3 (1984).
58. Id. at 3158. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (1983). It has been argued by one of the
authors elsewhere that this aggravating circumstance is so overbroad that it is essentially
meaningless. See Mello, Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circum-
stance: Narrowing the Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making it Smaller, 13
STETSON L REv. 523 (1984).
59. Fu&_ STAT. § 921.141(5)(b) (1983).
60. Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981).
61. Id. at 1122-23. Because the defense had not received this report, the trial court's
consideration of it violated Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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mining that Spaziano had been previously convicted of violent
felonies, however, the court relied upon Spaziano's prior convic-
tions for rape and aggravated battery. These convictions had not
been introduced to the sentencing jury at the initial proceeding be-
cause of the judge's mistaken belief that these offenses could not
properly be considered due to a pending appeal. The Florida Su-
preme Court affirmed the death sentence.2
In the United States Supreme Court, Spaziano's challenge to the
jury override drew heavily from Professor Stephen Gillers' article
Deciding Who Dies.03 Professor Gillers argued that death is a qual-
itatively different kind of punishment from any other, in part be-
cause its justification in an individual case is essentially and
uniquely retributive. Since the death penalty is society's expression
of outrage at especially offensive conduct, the jury, as representa-
tive of the community whose outrage is being expressed, is more
likely to reliably rank the offender and his offense on the yardstick
of community outrage.6 As evidence of this proposition, Spaziano,
again following Gillers, surveyed the overwhelming rejection in this
country of judge sentencing in capital cases, while noting that
judge sentencing in noncapital cases is all but universal.6 5
The United States Supreme Court found that this argument
"obviously has some appeal,"' but rejected it for two reasons.
First, the Court found that retribution is not the sole justification
for imposing death in individual cases; deterrence and incapacita-
tion also have a role. Second, the Court reasoned that even assum-
ing that retribution is what sets capital sentencing apart from
other punishments, it does not follow that jury sentencing is re-
quired: "Imposing the sentence in individual cases is not the sole
or even the primary vehicle through which the community's voice
62. Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
63. Gillers, supra note 8, at 39-74. Gillers was not writing about the jury override, al-
though his thesis was that capital defendants have a right to jury sentencing. As the Court
observed in Spaziano, however,
[Pletitioner points out that we need not decide whether jury sentencing in all
capital cases is required; this case presents only the question whether, given a jury
verdict of life, the judge may override that verdict and impose death. As counsel
acknowledged at oral argument, however, his fundamental premise is that the cap-
ital sentencing decision is one that, in all cases, should be made by a jury... We
therefore address that fundamental premise.
Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3161 (citation omitted).
64. Gillers, supra note 8, at 47-59.
65. Brief of Petitioner at 23-27, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984). See Gillers,
supra note 8, at 41-44, 101-19; see also supra note 7.
66. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3163.
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can be expressed. . . . The community's voice is heard at least as
clearly in the legislature when the death penalty is authorized
.... IM This reasoning permitted the Court to acknowledge the
facts that most states have jury sentencing in capital cases and
that in most states a jury verdict of life imprisonment is binding,
but to give these facts little significance. The Court concluded that
"[t]he Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State
reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over
how best to administer its criminal laws." 8
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented from the majority's treatment of the jury override issue.
They argued that juries as an institution are best able to determine
whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment in a
specific case:
Because it is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a
rule of law as judges normally understand such rules, but rather
is ultimately understood only as an expression of the community's
outrage-its sense that an individual has lost his moral entitle-
ment to live-I am convinced that the danger of an excessive re-
sponse can only be avoided if the decision to impose the death
penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single governmental
official. This conviction is consistent with the judgment of history
and the current consensus of opinion that juries are better
equipped than judges to make capital sentencing decisions. The
basic explanation for that consensus lies in the fact that the ques-
tion whether a sentence of death is excessive in the particular cir-
cumstances of any case is one that must be answered by the deci-
sionmaker that is best able to "express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death." 69
Justice Stevens also pointed out that Florida's stated reasons for
the override counsel against its validity. The override was enacted
after what one writer has called the "constitutional earthquake"70
following Furman v. Georgia's invalidation of all existing death
67. Id. at 3164.
68. Id. at 3165. The Court also rejected two of Spaziano's other jury override arguments.
First, the Court held that the override does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment. Id. Second, the Court found that the override had not been applied in
Spaziano's case in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Id. at 3166.
69. Id. at 3167-68 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519) (footnotes omitted); see also
Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3172-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. R BERcmA DAm PENALTIS 3 (1982). Justice Stevens did not characterize Furman
in this way.
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statutes. No one knew for certain whether a constitutional capital
punishment scheme was even possible. "A legislative choice that is
predicated on this sort of misunderstanding is not entitled to the
same presumption of validity as one that rests wholly on a legisla-
tive assessment of sound policy and community sentiment. 7 1 Jus-
tice Stevens also took issue with the majority's conclusion that
judges possess special expertise in sentencing, reasoning that while
this may be true of noncapital sentencing, it is not the case in capi-
tal sentencing because "the death penalty is unique. . .. The de-
cision . . . is not one that has traditionally been entrusted to
judges. ' '1 2
In Spaziano, the United States Supreme Court held that the
jury override does not offend the Constitution. The Court was will-
ing to defer to the Florida legislature's judgment that the override
is sound policy. The issue thus seems to have been exclusively con-
signed to the Florida legislature.
The topic is not a new one for Florida lawmakers. Legislation
has been proposed repeatedly to repeal the override.73 In the 1984
legislative session, the House Committee on Criminal Justice held
hearings on House Bill 820, which proposed amending the capital
statute to render a jury's recommendation of a life sentence bind-
ing on the judge; a jury's vote for death would have remained sub-
ject to the override. 4 The Committee voted ten to seven to strike
the bill's enacting clause, thus foreclosing consideration of the
bill. 5 Override repeal legislation was again introduced in the 1985
legislative session.78 This Article addresses the possible concerns of
71. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3171 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. For example, Senator Gordon introduced Fla. SB 944 (1980).
74. The bill would have amended the statute to provide that "[i]n the event the recom-
mendation of the majority of the jury is that the defendant be sentenced to life imprison-
ment, the court shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment." Fla. HB 820 (1984).
75. Fla. H.R., Committee on Criminal Justice, authors' unofficial transcription of tape
recording of proceedings at 32 (Apr. 20, 1984) (on file, Florida State University Law Re-
view) [hereinafter cited as Unofficial Transcript].
76. Fla. HB 273 (1985); Fla. SB 940 (1985). Senate Bill 940 was introduced by Senator
Dunn and cosponsored by nineteen other Senators. The bill provided that in capital cases
involving offenses committed after January 1, 1986, if "the recommendation of the majority
of the jury is that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment, the court shall enter a
sentence of life imprisonment." The bill was assigned to the Senate Corrections, Judiciary-
Criminal, and Appropriations Committees. The Judiciary Committee, following hearings,
voted in favor of the bill by a vote of 5-2, and the Corrections Committee did the same by a
vote of 3-2. No action was taken by the Appropriations Committee or by the full Senate.
The House of Representatives' counterpart, HE3 273 (1985), was assigned to the Commit-
tee on Criminal Justice. That Committee never took a final vote on the bill, so the proposed
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the legislators and advocates that the jury override be abandoned.
IV. THE DEATH DECISION AS AN EXPRESSION OF COMMUNITY
OUTRAGE
It is the position of this Article that the only possible justifica-
tion for capital punishment is retribution. 7 The intuitive notion
that the greater the punishment, the greater its inevitable deter-
rent value is belied by four decades of social science research dem-
onstrating that capital punishment deters no more effectively than
does life imprisonment.7 8 Rehabilitation is "obviously inapplicable
legislation never reached the floor of the full House.
77. The thesis that communal revenge is a proper penalogical justification is not, of
course, universally recognized. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 239-41 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 So.
CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1164-1180 (1980). Further, support for institutionalized retribution does
not necessarily translate into support for the death penalty. See, eg., S. JAcOBY, WiLD Jus-
TicE 233-89 (1983).
78.
The trouble with this intuition is that the people who are doing the reasoning and
the people who are doing the murdering are not the same people. You and I do
not commit murder for a lot of reasons other than the death penalty. The death
penalty might perhaps also deter us from murdering-but altogether needlessly,
since we would not murder with or without it. Those who are sufficiently dissocial-
ized to murder... are not responding to the world in the way that we are, and we
simply cannot "intuit" their thinking processes from ours.
Amsterdam, Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY m AmmcA 357 (H. Bedau ed.
1982). Although not absolutely definitive (in part due to the empirical difficulties in proving
a negative), the existing evidence is strong and consistent. See generally W. BowEns, LEGAL
Homcma 271-336 (1984); To DEATH PENALTY iN AMERicA 95-181 (H. Bedau ed. 1982);
Frost, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Conflicting Evidence?, 74 J. CmR L & CRunU-
NOLOGY 927 (1983); McFarland, Is Capital Punishment a Short-Term Deterrent to Homi-
cide: A Study of the Effects of Four Recent American Executions, 74 J. CRlM L & CRM-
NOLOGY 1014 (1983). But see Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A
Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. Rnv. 397 (1975); Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence
and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975); Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some
Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. Po. EcoN. 741 (1977). But see Baldus &
Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of
Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L J. 187 (1975);
Passell & Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AML EcoN.
REv. 447 (1977); Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts vs. Faiths 1976
Sup. Or. REv. 317. The Supreme Court has left the debate to the social scientists and to the
individual state legislatures. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-86. Prosecutprs continue to argue to
juries that the death penalty deters. See, e.g., Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1394-95,
1407-09 & nn.39-40 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Drake v. Kemp 762 F.2d 1449, 1459 (11th
Cir. 1985) (en banc); Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 361 (1984).
In any case, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Spaziano dissent, the deterrence ration-
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to the death sentence." 9 Incapacitation "would be served by exe-
cution, but in view of the availability of imprisonment as an alter-
nate means of preventing the defendant from violating the law in
the future, the death sentence [is] an excessive response to this
concern."80 Retribution remains the central justification for decree-
ing that a particular human being should die."1
In Gregg v. Georgia,8 2 the United States Supreme Court opined
that "capital punishment is an expression of society's moral out-
rage at particularly offensive conduct" and that "the decision that
capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme
cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes
are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only
adequate response may be the penalty of death."s The Court ap-
provingly quoted Lord Justice Denning:
Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denuncia-
tion of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it
is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should
adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citi-
zens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punish-
ment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing
else.... The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that
society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer
deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not. ,
ale would not matter in the context of the jury override issue:
[Tihe deterrence rationale in itself argues only for ensuring that the death sen-
tence be imposed in a significant number of cases and remain as a potential social
response to the defined conduct. Since the decision whether to employ jury sen-
tencing does not change the number of cases for which death is a possible punish-
ment, the use of judicial sentencing cannot have sufficient impact on the deterrent
effect of the statute to justify its use; a murderer's calculus will not be affected by
whether the death penalty is imposed by a judge or jury.
Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3173 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote
ommitted).
79. Spaziano, 104 S. CL at 3172 (Stevens J., dissenting).
80. Id. But cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3408-09 (1983) (future dangerousness
may be considered at penalty phase).
81. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 54-56.
82. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
83. Id. at 183, 184.
84. Id. at 184 n.30 (citation omitted) (quoting ROYAL CoMISSION ON CAPrrAL PUNMSH-
MENT. MINUTES OF EVMDENCE 207 (Dec. 1, 1949)). The roots of modern concepts of revenge
are traced in Susan Jacoby's excellent book, Wild Justice. Jacoby argues that retribution
has a legitimate place in a system of criminal justice, but she also recognizes that the "death
penalty is not merely legalized vengeance but vengeance taken to its extremity." S. JACOBY,
WILD JusTicE 235 (1983). Other writers explore retribution generally. See, e.g., W. Bans.
FOR CAPrrAL PuNsHmBNT 144-175 (1979); MK CoHPN, REASON AND LAW 50 (1950); H. PACKER.
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Thus, the sentencer's task in a capital case is to determine where
the defendant and his crime are located on the scale of community
outrage. The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged
that the jury's recommendation of life or death "represent[s] the
judgment of the community as to whether the death sentence is
appropriate" in a given case.85 Given that the purpose of a death
sentence is to -reflect community standards, judges should be de-
nied the power of the override unless or until we are willing to
evaluate prospective judges as to their propensity to embody com-
munal consciousness.
A judge is a figure of respect in our society and therefore, at
least to some extent, stands apart from it. Judges have quite dis-
tinct statutory qualifications. For example, to be a circuit judge in
Florida, one must have been a member of the Florida Bar for at
least five years and must not be more than seventy years of age.8s
In addition to such formal requirements, there seem to be informal
ones. A survey of the Florida circuit bench shows that it is over-
THE LIMI OF THE CRmMAL SANcTIoN 43-44 (1968); J. STEPHEN, A GENER4L VIEw OF THE
CIMmAL LAw OF ENGLAND 99 (2d ed. 1890); E VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRrwNALS 12-13
(1975); Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976
Wisc. L Rav. 781, 798; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L & CoNmW. SocAL
Peos. 401 (1958).
As this Article was being prepared, an event of note caught the nation's attention. A com-
muter on a New York City subway shot and seriously wounded four youths who had ac-
costed him for cigarettes and money. The event sparked a wave of national outrage--against
the four young blacks who were shot. George Will, writing of the incident and its aftermath,
also expressed why the death penalty is today so popular.
When a society becomes, like ours, uneasy about calling prisons penitentiaries or
penal institutions and instead calls them "correctional institutions," the society
has lost its bearings. If prisoners are "corrected," that is nice but it is an ancillary
outcome. The point of imprisonment is punishment. The idea of punishment is
unintelligible if severed from the idea of retribution, which is inseparable from the
idea of vengeance, which is an expression of anger. No anger, no justice. A society
incapable of sustained, focused anger in the form of controlled vengeance is
decadent.
Will, Let Us Now Praise Anger, NEwswEEK, Jan. 7, 1985, at 68.
85. McCampbell v. State, 421 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1982); see also Richardson v. State,
437 So. 2d 1091, 1095 (Fla. 1983); Quince v. State, 414 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 895 (1982); Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936, 942 (Fla. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.
925 (1982); McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 1977). That jurors take their task
seriously is suggested by the performance of the jury in the highly-charged "mercy killing"
case of Roswell Gilbert. Although much of the public decried Gilbert's conviction of first
degree murder as excessively harsh, and condemned his jury as unreasonable, the best ac-
dount of the jury's deliberations, based on interviews with eleven of the twelve jurors, sug-
gests otherwise. See May, No Way Out, The Miami Herald (Tropic Magazine), July 7, 1985,
at 12.
86. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8.
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whelmingly comprised of white males.87 While there are no avail-
able statistics concerning economic class, the realities of the ex-
pense of a law school education make it more probable than not
that judges are from economically stable backgrounds. Even if the
judge grew up in poverty, however, his five years as a member of
the Florida Bar have probably secured him a healthy income as
well as considerable status.88
The composite sketch of the judge must be contrasted with that
of the juror. To be eligible for jury duty in Florida one must be at
least eighteen years of age, a citizen of the state, and a registered
elector of his or her respective county.89 The eligible population is
52% female and 48% male, 13.8% Black and 8.8% Hispanic. The
median annual income in Florida is $17,280, with at least 9.9% of
the families surviving below the poverty line. At least 17.3% of the
population is over the age of sixty-five, with 11.4% being over the
age of seventy. Although these figures represent the entire popula-
tion of Florida, for our purposes we assumed that the figures for
eligible jurors would reflect a similar statistical composition.90
These differences in potential objective traits between judges
and jurors widen when the chasm between judges and capital de-
fendants is measured. Apart from gender, judges and capital defen-
dants tend to be at opposite ends of the spectrum. This is signifi-
cant because people generally have compassion for persons most
like themselves. One study has concluded that in practice, Florida
juries have been less likely to be influenced by a capital defen-
dant's race and class than have been Florida judges.91
The requirement that a capital sentencing jury consist of twelve
persons as compared with a solitary person acting as judge also
contributes to the prospect that a cross section of the community
will be making the sentencing decision. The United States Su-
87. According to the Florida State Court Administrator's Office, as of December 31,
1984, there were 334 circuit judge positions with 4 vacancies, 8 Black, 18 women, and 1
Hispanic. Assuming that the Blacks and Hispanics are male, the statistics then show that
0.3% of the circuit judges are Hispanic, 2.41% of the judges are Black, and 5.2% of the
judges are women. See computer printout accompanying Letter from H.B. Beasley, Director
of Judicial Personnel Relations, to Michael Mello (Jan. 31, 1985) (on file, Florida State
University Law Review).
88. See, e.g., D. KEN~NY, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE PoLrTcs
OF LAw (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
89. FL& STAT. §§ 40.01, 913.12 (1983).
90. 1984 FLORIDA STATISTICAL AnsTRAcT 15 table 1.34, 33 tables 1.40 and 1.41, 165 table
5.51, 168 table 5.52, 15 table 1.34 (all figures based on 1980 census).
91. Gillers, supra note 8, at 68 n.317 (quoting L. Foley, Florida After the Furman Deci-
sion: Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death Penalty (unpublished manuscript)).
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preme Court has surveyed the social science data and concluded
that the likelihood of correct application of "the common sense of
the community to the facts" 92 in a criminal case increases with the
number of decision makers.93 This is perhaps one reason for the
Florida legislature's mandate that twelve persons compose a jury
that will deliberate on a capital or other serious crime. 4
Juries, by definition, represent "a fair cross section of the com-
munity" and therefore reflect community values.9 5 The jurors need
not speculate on community sentiment, because the response of
the jury is the response of society.99 By contrast, the judge's role is
not to speak for the community, but to apply the law impartially.
Because of his unique status in society as well as his failure to re-
flect the objective qualifications of the average citizen, a judge may
not be as finely calibrated to the fluctuations of community out-
rage as the average citizen-juror. Involvement in the criminal jus-
tice system on a day to day basis may serve to make judges callous
not only to the horror of the crime but also to the ultimate issue of
life or death. Further, it is questionable whether a jurist can ethi-
cally seek to speak for the community. The Canons of Judicial
Ethics provide that a judge "should be unswayed by partisan inter-
ests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
9 7
The imposition of capital punishment "rests on not a legal but
an ethical judgment-an assessment of ... the 'moral guilt' of the
defendant."9 8 A judge is an expert in the law, not an ethicist. Soci-
ety has made a determination that capital punishment in extreme
92. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978).
93. In Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233, the Court examined empirical data suggesting that "the
smaller the group, the less likely it is to overcome the biases of its members to obtain an
accurate result" (citation omitted). It is interesting that Ballew was an obscenity case, the
sort of issue which, like the death decision, is uniquely based on evolving community
standards.
94. FLA. STAT. § 913.10(1) (1983) provides that "[t]welve persons shall constitute a jury
to try all capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases."
See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
95. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 US. 357, 359 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 531-32 (1975); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
It is interesting to note that The Miami Herald, which supports the death penalty gener-
ally, advocates abolition of the override for this very reason. See Objection, Your Honor,
Miami Herald, Mar. 27, 1985, at 24A; Jury's Precedence, Miami Herald, Nov. 7, 1984, at
22A, col. 1; Let Jurors Decide Death Penalty, Miami Herald, Apr. 24, 1980, at 6A, col.1; see
also Overkill in Florida, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1984, at A-22, col. 1; Decision on execution
should rest with jurors, Tallahassee Democrat, Nov. 20, 1983, at 213, col.
96. Gillers, supra note 8, at 64.
97. CODE OF JuDicuL CoNDucr, Canon 3(A)(1) (1972).
98. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cases is justified because it expresses the community's moral out-
rage. Thus, an appropriate cross section of the community whose
outrage is being expressed should be given the responsibility for
that decision.
One may accept the general proposition that jury sentencing is
required in capital cases to ascertain the conscience of the commu-
nity and yet argue that judicial sentencing is required for senten-
cing consistency. In Proffitt v. Florida, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the facial constitutionality of Florida's death penalty
statute and observed that "judicial sentencing should lead, if any-
thing, to even greater consistency. . . , since a trial judge is more
experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able
to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases." 9
Yet capital cases in any one judicial circuit are relatively rare;10
the actual number of capital cases over which a single judge will
preside will be proportionately smaller.101 The ordinary predicates
which provide consistency in noncapital cases, such as frequency
with which such an offense is tried, observation of the recidivism
rate for the offense, experience with the local probation and parole
officers, and general criminal experience, do not pertain in the
same degree, if at all, to capital cases.10 2
Moreover, judicial sentencing itself has been criticized in recent
years for its high degree of inconsistency. 0 -3 The discretion of sen-
tencing judges is being replaced with specific statutory guidelines
and more limited options in determining terms of imprisonment.
Florida's recent adoption of sentencing guidelines in non-capital
cases occurred within this context. 0 ' Finally, present practice al-
ready provides for the Florida Supreme Court to conduct propor-
tionality review in each case, to determine whether the death sen-
tence in that case is excessive compared to the norm of capital
cases in the state.
99. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
100. Gillers, supra note 8, at 57-59.
101. Id. But see Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3440 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that Judge R. Hudson Olliff had sentenced four defendants to death following jury
recommendations of life).
102. Gillers, supra note 8, at 57-58.
103. See generally FLA. R CRiK P. 3.701, 3.998 (1983); A. PARTRIDGE, A. CHASET & W.
ELDRIDGE, THE SENTENCING OPTIONS OF FEDERAL DIsTcr JUDGES (rev. ed. 1981); SENTENC-
ING ALTERNATivES AND PROCEDURES § 3.1, (Approved Draft 1968); Hoffman & Stone-
Meierhoefer, Application of Guidelines of Sentencing, 3 L. & Psc. REv. 53 (1977).
104. FIA. R Cara P. 3.701 (1983); FLA. STAT. § 921.001 (1983); In re Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 439 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1983) (adopting sentencing guidelines).
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In sum, experience or expertise is no substitute for the ability of
a jury to reflect community sentiment in its decision whether to
impose the death penalty. It is the jury that the framers of the
United States Constitution sought to invest with special powers in
order to protect individuals from the government.
V. THE ROLE OF THE JURY AS BULWARK BETWEEN INDIVMUALS
AND GOVERNMENT
Juries have a unique place in the theory and practice of the
American criminal justice system. The jury of lay people legiti-
mates the exercise of governmental power over the life or liberty of
the citizen, 05 and "places the real direction of society in the hands
of the governed... and not in... the government" 106 In decid-
ing that the right to jury trial is fundamental and thus binding on
the states through the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the right to a jury is "granted to criminal defendants
in order to prevent oppression by the Government"' 7 and to pro-
tect "against arbitrary action ... [by] the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge."108
The jury trial right "reflect[s] a fundamental decision about the
exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges."110 Thus, "the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in
the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the com-
mon-sense judgment of a group of laymen."'1 0
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Spaziano,"' and Professor Gillers,
in his article Deciding Who Dies,"2 argued persuasively that the
reason for requiring a jury to decide guilt or innocence---"the right
to have an authentic representative of the community apply its lay
perspective to the determination that must precede a deprivation
of liberty-applies with special force to the determination that
must precede a deprivation of life.""" The structure of the penalty
105. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3176-77 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 WAs. & LEE L Rzv. 1, 5 (1966) (quoting A. DE
TocQuEviLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Reeve Trans. 1948)).
107. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
108. Id. at 156.
109. Id.
110. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 US. 404, 410 (1972) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 100 (1970)).
111. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3174-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Gillers, supra note 8, at 65-67.
113. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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phase resembles a trial, "[b]ut more important than its procedural
aspects, the life-or-death decision in capital cases depends on its
link to community values for its moral and constitutional
legitimacy. ''1114
The central function of the jury as a bulwark between an indi-
vidual and the government is especially vital when the individual's
life is at stake.
VI. THE ISSUE OF COST AND EFFICIENCY
This Article does not concede that monetary and efficiency con-
siderations are proper in the context of deciding whether an indi-
vidual should live or die. Courts have not found such variables de-
terminative in other important areas of the law.115 Nevertheless,
the Florida legislature is budget conscious. The bill analysis for
HB 820, the override repeal legislation introduced by Representa-
tive James Burke in the 1984 Session, concluded that the "primary
argument for the bill is economy.11 6 The bill analysis recognized a
114. Id.
115. The Court in recent years has emphasized non-financial "social costs" in defining
the limits of remedies for certain previously recognized substantive rights. The most notable
example of this is the Court's treatment of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See,
e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412-13 (1984); United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620, 627 (1980); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974). Even in this
limited context, a cost-benefit approach has drawn sharp criticism from dissenters who be-
lieve that "personal liberties are not based on the law of averages." Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3438
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 506, 834 (1975)).
Still, in deciding whether to give constitutional stature to a previously unrecognized sub-
stantive right, the Court has not found fiscal impact controlling. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma,
105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) (right to psychiatrist as a defense expert); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389
U.S. 40 (1967) (right to transcript of preliminary hearing); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony trials); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(right to counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to trial transcript).
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court did note in the margin that the
nation's legal resources were sufficient to implement a right to counsel in misdemeanor trihls
carrying the possibility of imprisonment, a right first recognized in that case. Id. at 37 n.7.
See also Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct 1087, 1094-95 (1985) (discussing fiscal impact of recog-
nizing indigent defendant's right to expert psychiatric assistance in preparing for capital
trial). Justice Powell, while concurring with the result in Argersinger, stressed the costs of
the constitutional principle embraced by the majority, 407 U.S. at 58-63, but concluded that
if the Constitution requires the rule announced by the majority, the consequences
are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the guarantee of due process required the
assistance of counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed or that the
only workable method of insuring justice is to adopt the majority's rule, I would
not hesitate to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as to its effect upon
the administration of justice.
Id. at 62.
116. Fla. H.R., Committee on Criminal Justice, HB 820 Bill Analysis at 2 (Mar. 26, 1984)
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previously proffered conclusion that "[t]he strongest predictor of a
favorable Florida Supreme Court decision is a jury recommenda-
tion of life imprisonment rather than death." 1 7 The bill analysis
cited statistics showing that
as of March 1, 1984, 347 persons had been sentenced to death
under the current law. In 85 of those cases the trial judge over-
rode the jury's advisory sentence of life. Sixty-one of those cases
have been reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court and only 19
were affirmed. Of those 19, 7 were later reversed by a federal
court. Thus roughly 4/5 of the decisions to override the jury's rec-
ommended life sentence have been reversed on appeal. 1 8
When Senator Edgar Dunn, sponsor of the Senate counterpart to
HB 820,119 testified in support of HB 820 he stressed considera-
tions of efficiency:
[In] [s]eventy-five percent of the cases where the judge has over-
(on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Bill Analysis]. See also
infra note 124.
117. Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penalty Appeals, 74
J. CraM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 913, 923 (1983).
118. Bill Analysis, supra note 116, at 2 (citing letter from Michael L. Radelet to All
Legislators, House and Senate, Apr. 16, 1984) (letter on file, Florida State University Law
Review). See also Radelet, supra note 9, manuscript at 12-13.
With one exception, these reversals by the Florida Supreme Court were predicated on the
trial court's erroneous disregard of the jury's verdict for life:
As of March 15, 1985, the Florida Supreme Court had reduced 39 cases with jury
recommendations of life to sentences of life. We identified the decisions in these
cases and read them to determine the court's reasons for reducing the cases to life.
For each case we listed the court's reasons, and then compared them. This analy-
sis revealed a strong and consistent pattern. The Florida Supreme Court clearly
disagreed with the trial judge's reasoning in 38 of the 39 cases. That is, the Florida
Supreme Court indicated that the jury was correct in its decision to recommend
life, and the trial judge was incorrect in overriding the jury. In the last case, the
court reduced the sentence to life due to an unusual situation involving different
juries at the guilt and sentencing phases.
Memorandum from Margaret Vandiver and Gail Anderson, Volunteer Lawyers Resource
Center, Inc., Florida State University, to Eva Davis, Apr. 2, 1985, at 2 (on file, Florida State
University Law Review). See also Fla. S., SB 940 Staff Analysis and Economic Impact
Statement at 3 (Apr. 24, 1985) (on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Staff Analysis]; Fla. H.R., Committee on Criminal Justice, HB 273 Staff
Analysis at 3 (Apr. 4, 1985) (on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as House Staff Analysis].
The House Staff Analysis noted that such a "large reversal rate may create a public per-
6eption that capital felons are escaping justice through technical and dilatory appeals. This
perception undermines the integrity and credibility of the trial courts' determinations." Id.
at 3.
119. Fla. SB 660 (1984).
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turned [a] recommended sentence of mercy by [the] jury, the ap-
pellate courts have overturned that decision. I believe the ineffi-
ciency in the system that is only twenty-five percent right is
compelling of our attention. I can't imagine us as civil lawyers
permitting a system to exist that is so frequently in error. If I
thought that the judges hearing my cases on the civil side down in
Daytona were going to be wrong seventy-five percent of the time,
I'd be up there asking my fellow legislators to try to find a system
that was a little more . . . reliable than one that produced such
results.120
In addition to the error factor, the burden on the courts, especially
the Florida Supreme Court, is a consideration. One former Justice
of the Florida Supreme Court estimated that the court spent from
thirty-five to forty percent of its time on death penalty cases, and
two former research aides to Florida Supreme Court Justice Ben
Overton have written that "[u]nquestionably, the most difficult
and time-consuming class of cases which the court reviews is the
direct appeal from a circuit court order imposing the death pen-
alty. $1 21 A calculation made in 1983 concluded that the backlog of
death penalty cases at the Florida Supreme Court was one hun-
dred three. It would take the court approximately two and one-half
years to clear this backlog. Thirty of these cases were pending pre-
cisely because a circuit judge had rejected a jury recommendation
of a life sentence.1 22 If the power of judges to override the jury's
recommendation of a life sentence were repealed, it is suggested
that the Florida Supreme Court's caseload would be reduced by
twenty-five percent. 121
Precise monetary figures concerning the cost of the jury override
are not available, though rough estimates have been ventured. Any
conclusion that the cost of executing a person is less than the cost
of housing that person- in prison fails to take into account the ex-
pense of the appeal and postconviction system.-2 At least one
120. Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 7.
121. Letter from Michael L. Radelet, supra note 118, at 2; Borgognoni & Keane, supra
note 9, at 329.
122. Skene, Judges, not juries, have last say on death sentences ii Florida, St. Peters-
burg Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at 1-A, col..
123. Id.
124. "The point is not that it is cheaper to keep a particular person in prison for life
than it is to execute him. It is, rather, that the system-the judicial and correctional pro-
cess-will be less expensive if it is not burdened by a death penalty." Nakell, The Cost of
the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMuCA 241, 241 (H. Bedau ed. 1982). See
also THE ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS CoMmrrrEa AND THE DIVISION op TE BUDGEr, CAPrrAL
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commentator has guessed that the cost of a direct appeal to the
Florida Supreme Court is about one hundred thousand dollars.12 5
Multiplied by eighty-seven override cases, the cost to the state is
$8.7 million. This cost cannot be offset by concomitant savings to
the Department of Corrections, because two-thirds of that eight
and one-half million dollars is "wasted" when the judge's override
decision is reversed by the Florida Supreme Court and the state
must sustain the successful appellant's life in prison.
The statistics derived from analyzing the jury override in terms
of monetary cost and governmental efficiency support the conclu-
sion that the override should be repealed. However, a more impor-
tant reason to abandon the practice of allowing a judge to override
a jury's recommendation of life exists.
VII. THE PossmrrTY OF EXECUTING AN INNOCENT PERSON
Although "the capital convicting and sentencing process has nec-
essarily become extraordinarily careful to avoid executing those
who are innocent or who deserve some sentence other than
LossE. Tm PRICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YoRK STATE, REPORT FROM THE PUBLIc
DEFENSE BACKUP CENTER To THE SENATE FINANCE CommIrrra (1982) (on file, Florida State
University Law Review).
This is so because capital trials are more costly than noncapital trials; because the appeals
and postconviction challenges end only days or even hours before execution (in Florida, the
average time between sentence and execution is eight to ten years); and because the correc-
tions system is more costly (due to elements such as special security requirements). See
Nakell, supra, at 241. Yet this cumbersome system is necessary "to assure that innocent
people are not executed, that constitutional rights are not violated, and that invidious con-
siderations such as race are not the true motivating forces behind executions." Greenberg,
Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE LJ. 908, 926 (1982).
The Senate Staff Analysis, supra note 118, concluded that the fiscal impact of the over-
ride's repeal would be:
Indeterminate. If more death penalty sentences were commuted to life sentences,
the number of appeals made by the inmate and defended by the Department of
Legal Affairs would be reduced drastically resulting in a saving of legal expenses.
On the other hand, if an inmate's death sentence is commuted to life imprison-
ment, then the state must bear an additional expense of approximately $9,563 to
house the inmate each year of his life. A caveat should be noted here: the provi-
sion of this fiscal data is not intended in any way to reduce life or the merits of
this bill to an economic argument.
Id. at 1-2.
The House Staff Analysis, supra note 118, noted that "judicial proceedings at all levels of
state and federal governments occur with much greater frequency in death cases. Most life
sentence cases are resolved finally by the District Courts of Appeal, rather than the state or
federal courts." Id. at 2.
125. See, eg., Letter from Michael L. Radelet, supra note 118, at 2. See also Radelet,
supra note 9, manuscript at 14.
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death," 26 the fact remains that the capital punishment system is
not foolproof. Errors are inevitable in a system conceived and gov-
erned by humans. Professor Charles Black has demonstrated that
the problems of mistake and arbitrariness in capital cases are "not
fringe-problems, susceptible to being mopped up by minor refine-
ments in concept and technique, but are at the very core of the
matter and are insoluble by any methods now known or foresee-
able. 1 2 7 The question is whether the risk of error in a given enter-
prise is acceptable or unacceptable given the gravity of the result-
ing consequences. A person who has been put to death by the state
cannot be resurrected, even if it is later determined that the per-
son was innocent of the convicted crime. For this reason, the
United States Supreme Court's capital cases over the past decade
have attempted to reduce the risk of error in the death decision.
The jury override, however, increases that risk to an intolerable
level.
Jurors are instructed to determine the guilt of an accused be-
yond a "reasonable doubt." There is, however, another type of
doubt, often called "whimsical doubt," i.e., doubt not rising to the
level of reasonable doubt. If a juror entertained such a whimsical
doubt, he or she would still be duty bound to convict the defen-
dant. Yet such a doubt as to the guilt of a capital defendant is an
important consideration in deciding whether to impose an irrevo-
cable penalty. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit recently explained:
The fact that jurors have determined guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt does not necessarily mean that no juror entertained any
126. Greenberg, supra note 124, at 908.
127. C. BLACK. CAPITAL PUNISHMEN. THE INvImAILrrY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 17-18
(2d ed. 1981); see also J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NoT GUiLTY (1957); E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING
THE INNOCENT (1932); Amsterdam, supra note 78, at 349. See generally H. Bedau & M.
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases (June 1, 1985) (unpublished
manuscript).
Good examples are the cases of Freddie Pitts and Wilbert Lee, who were twice sentenced
to death in Florida. They spent twelve years in Florida prisons, most of them on death row.
In 1975, the Florida Cabinet, in its capacity as the state clemency board, pardoned Pitts and
Lee on the basis of a finding that they were in fact innocent. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 239-41 (1982); G. MnILER INVITATION TO A LYNCHING (1975). "[0]nly
the general constitutional attack which we were then mounting upon the death penalty in
Florida kept Pitts and Lee alive long enough to permit discovery of the evidence of their
innocence." Amsterdam, supra note 78, at 349. The constitutional attack resulted in a ten-
year moratorium on executions. See supra note 3. That constitutional attack "is now dead,
and so would Pitts and Lee be if they were tried tomorrow." Amsterdam, supra note 78, at
349.
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doubt whatsoever. There may be no reasonable doubt-doubt
based upon reason -and yet some genuine doubt exists. It may
reflect a mere possibility; it may be but the whimsy of one juror
or several. Yet this whimsical doubt-this absence of absolute
certainty-can be real.
The capital defendant whose guilt seems abundantly demon-
strated may be neither obstructing justice nor engaged in an exer-
cise in futility when his counsel mounts a vigorous defense on the
merits. It may be proffered in the slight hope of unanticipated
success; it might seek to persuade one or more to prevent una-
nimity for conviction; it is more likely to produce only whimsical
doubt. Even the latter serves the defendant, for the juror enter-
taining doubt which does not rise to reasonable doubt can be ex-
pected to resist those who would impose the irremedial penalty of
death.128
The Model Penal Code also recognizes that residual doubt con-
cerning guilt is an appropriate consideration during the penalty
phase of a capital case. Model Penal Code article 210.6 provides for
a separate penalty proceeding before the trial judge and jury dur-
ing which evidence is presented concerning the enumerated miti-
gating and aggravating factors. However, the trial judge may forego
the penalty phase, and impose a sentence of life imprisonment if
the court is satisfied that "although the evidence suffices to sustain
the verdict, it does not foreclose all doubt respecting the defen-
dant's guilt."12" The 1980 comments to the Code explained this
provision as "an accommodation to the irrevocability of the capital
sanction. Where doubt of guilt remains, the opportunity to reverse
a conviction on the basis of new evidence must be preserved, and a
sentence of death is obviously inconsistent with that goal."'30
Thus, the drafters of the Model Penal Code considered doubt
relating to guilt to be important enough to preclude the imposition
of the death sentence, notwithstanding the hypothetical existence
of a dozen aggravating circumstances. The British Royal Conmis-
sion on Capital Punishment took a similar position regarding re-
prieves when there remains a "scintilla" of doubt as to guilt.1"'
128. Smith v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Smith v.
Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1981)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1853 (1985); see also
Heiney v. Florida, 105 S. Ct. 303, 304 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari); King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1464 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2020
(1985).
129. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(f) (1980).
130. Id. at comment 5.
131. ROYAL CoMMIssioN ON CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953, para. 39, at 12 ("There are
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The American state courts which have considered the relevance
of less than reasonable doubt have not adhered to the liberal
Model Penal Code view. However, at least three states, Georgia,
Colorado, and California, have recognized that evidence as to guilt
is relevant at the penalty phase. In Blankenship v. State,132 a
unanimous Georgia Supreme Court reversed the defendant's sec-
ond death sentence. The first sentence had been previously va-
cated by the Georgia Supreme Court, and the case remanded for
resentencing. During the resentencing proceeding, the judge ex-
cluded all evidence of guilt or innocence, stating that the jury,
which in Georgia possesses the exclusive right to impose a death
sentence, would not need to "retry" the guilt issue. In vacating this
second death sentence, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
[w]hen the sentencing phase of a death penalty case is retried by
a jury other than the one which determined guilt, evidence
presented by the defense, as well as evidence presented by the
state, may not be excludedon the ground that it would only "go to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant." In essence, although the
resentencing trial will have no effect on any previous convictions,
the parties are entitled to offer evidence relating to circumstances
of the crime.183
The Colorado Supreme Court, in People v. District Court,-4
held that Colorado's death penalty statute was unconstitutional, in
part because "if the offender maintains his innocence, he is pre-
cluded from offering any mitigating circumstances at all."'" 5 In
People v. Terry,l3 6 a pre-Furman case, the California Supreme
Court observed that "[t]he lingering doubts of jurors in the guilt
phase may well cast their shadows into the penalty phase and in
some measure affect the nature of the punishment."' 137
In Florida, the Supreme Court has not granted the whimsical
doubt theory any credence. Although there are some pre-Furman
cases which are possibly to the contrary,'38 Florida's modern stance
those rare classes of cases in which reprieves may be granted. One is where the Home Secre-
tary feels that despite the verdict of the jury, there is still a 'scintilla' of doubt about the
prisoner's guilt.").
132. 308 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. 1983). See also Alderman v. State, 327 S.E.2d 168 (Ga. 1985).
133. 308 S.E.2d at 371.
134. 586 P.2d 31 (Colo. 1978).
135. Id. at 35.
136. 390 P.2d 381 (Cal.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866 (1964).
137. Id. at 387.
138. Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1956); Nims v. State, 70 So. 565, 566 (Fla. 1915).
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is set out in Buford v. State:139
A convicted defendant cannot be "a little bit guilty." It is un-
reasonable for a jury to say in one breath that a defendant's guilt
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, in the next
breath, to say someone else may have done it, so we recommend
mercy.
... Here the defendant committed the murder or Fat Boy did
it. This question was settled by the verdict of guilty. 40
Florida's disregard of the relationship between the jury's doubt
about guilt and the jury's recommendation of a life sentence dis-
counts a case such as Jaramillo v. State.'41 In Jaramillo, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court reversed two convictions for first degree mur-
der because it found that the circumstantial evidence introduced
by the state was legally insufficient to support the guilty verdicts.
The convictions and death sentences were accordingly vacated and
Jaramillo was ordered released from custody immediately. The re-
ported Florida Supreme Court opinion omits the fact that these
sentences were imposed by a Dade County circuit judge despite the
fact that the jury unanimously recommended a life sentence." 2 It
is extremely plausible that the jury entertained doubts about the
guilt of Jaramillo and thus declined to impose death sentences for
a savage double murder.
As noted at the outset of this Article, the first execution of a
person whose death sentence had been imposed as a result of the
jury override was Ernest Dobbert. Dobbert was convicted of bru-
tally torturing and murdering his own daughter. The jury recom-
mended a life sentence by a vote of ten to two. 43 Judge R. Hudson
Oliff disregarded the recommendation and imposed the death
139. 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
140. Id. at 953. This aspect of Buford was recently reaffirmed in Burr v. State, 466 So.
2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 1985). See also Sired v. State, 399 So. 2d 964, 972 (Fla. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
Justice Marshall has pointed out that a capital sentencer's refusal, as a matter of law, to
consider doubt about guilt as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance would violate Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See Heiney v. Florida, 105 S. Ct. 303 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
141. 417 So. 2d 257 (Fia. 1982).
142. Brief of Petitioner, appendix B, at 3b, Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984);
see also Katzenbach, Colombian convicted of 2 murders freed, Miami Herald, July 19, 1982,
at 1-D, col. 3.
143. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 287 (1977).
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sentence."4
At Dobbert's trial, much evidence was introduced concerning
Dobbert's violence toward his children. The conviction for first de-
gree murder, however, rested solely on the testimony of his thir-
teen-year-old son. This testimony was later recanted when the son
became an adult and stated in an affidavit that his trial testimony
was the result of hypnotism, thorazine, and his attempt to please
the staff at the children's home because they were good to him in a
way he had not known for years. 145 Although Dobbert undoubtedly
committed horrible acts upon his children, there exists real doubt
concerning whether Dobbert intentionally committed the first de-
gree murder of his daughter. Dobbert's execution does not remove
that doubt.146
VIII. APPELLATE REVIEW DOES NOT CURE THE OVERRIDE
Appellate review of override cases results in approximately two-
thirds of those death sentences being vacated by the Florida Su-
preme Court.1 47 However, even if society is willing to settle for pro-
portional justice and sacrifice the Dobberts to save the Jaramillos,
the appellate process cannot ensure that death sentences appropri-
ately express the moral conscience of the community.
In Tedder v. State,"8 the Florida Supreme Court held that
before a death sentence will be affirmed despite a jury's verdict
recommending life imprisonment "the facts suggesting a sentence
of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no rea-
sonable person could differ. 14 9 This means that the facts support-
144. As of mid-1983, Judge Olliff had sentenced four defendants, including Dobbert, to
death. In every one of these cases, the jury had returned a recommendation of life imprison-
ment. See Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3440 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145. Dobbert v. Florida, 105 S. Ct. 34, 34-35 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari). Today, young Dobbert's testimony would be excluded per se as the
product of hypnosis. Bundy v. State, 10 Fla. L.W. 269 (Fla. May 9, 1985).
146. Similarly, in his separate opinion in Spaziano, Justice Stevens noted that
while the crime for which petitioner was convicted was quite horrible, the case
against him was rather weak, resting as it did on the largely uncorroborated testi-
mony of a drug addict who said that petitioner had bragged to him of having
killed a number of women, and had led him to the victim's body. It may well be
that the jury was ... sufficiently troubled by the possibility that an irrevocable
mistake might be made, . . . that the jury concluded that a sentence of death
could not be morally justified in this case.
Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3178 n.34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. See supra note 118.
148. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fi. 1975).
149. Id. at 910.
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ing the aggravating circumstances must be such that no reasonable
person could disagree that they support a sentence of death and
also means that the facts supporting mitigating circumstances in
favor of a life sentence be so clearly nonexistent that no reasonable
person could find them.150
The problems with the Tedder standard are manifold. At first
blush the standard may seem similar to that for a judgment of ac-
quittal.151 Yet unlike measuring the legal sufficiency of evidence to
sustain a verdict, evidence supporting the decision of whether the
defendant should live or die is not subject to a strictly factual anal-
ysis. This is so in part because the yardstick used by the jury is its
sense of moral outrage at the defendant and his act.
Second, the Tedder standard seeks to judge whether the jurors
are acting as reasonable persons although "mercy, of course, can
never be a wholly rational, calculated, and logical process.' 5 2
Mercy is, by nature, a subjective determination. The standards for-
mulated to guide the sentencer's discretion are "intended to pre-
vent caprice in the decision to inflict the penalty; the isolated deci-
sion of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional
death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under
a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or
caprice." 153
A third problem with the Tedder standard is that in Florida the
jury does not make specific findings concerning its verdict for life
imprisonment. ' " Thus, "[1]ike Adam Smith's invisible hand, the
process of weighing evidence in capital sentencing is observable
only in its results."' 55 Because the jury's recommendation consists
merely of an opaque statement reflecting that a majority of the
jurors are in favor of either a life sentence or death, the sentencing
judge and the Florida Supreme Court can only speculate as to the
150. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
151. "If the jury returns a verdict of guilty... the defendant's motion [for judgment of
acquittal] may be made ...." FLA. R CRK P. 3.380(c) (1983). The federal counterpart to
this provision is FED. R CaI. P. 29(c) (1984).
152. Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1376 n.57 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 949 (1982).
153. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976).
154. Compare FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983) (judge imposing a death sentence must sup-
port sentence with findings) with id. § 921.141(2) (no comparable provision as to jury
recommendation).
155. Note, The Bitter Fruit of McGautha- Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Need for
Weighing Method Articulation in Capital Sentencing, 20 AK& CRm. L REv. 63, 77 (1982)
(citing A. Sburm, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCwLES AND CAUSES OF WEALTH OF NA77ONS (E.
Cannan ed. 1937)).
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underlying basis of the verdict. Most often, the court will not be
aware of the extent of the majority, unless the trial judge has
asked the jury foreperson to reveal how many jurors composed the
majority.156 In no event will the appellate court be aware of which
jurors recommended life or death, unless the verdict is unanimous.
The appellate court will not have had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor and attentiveness of the jurors, just as it does not
have the opportunity to observe the defendant who is the subject
of the jury's verdict. In sum, the Florida Supreme Court has no
basis upon which to determine whether the jurors acted as reason-
able persons, even if the decision made was a reasonable one.
Fourth, "reasonable persons can differ over the fate of every
criminal defendant in every death penalty case."1 5 In every jury
override case, a circuit judge and a jury composed of twelve men
and women have in fact disagreed on the appropriateness of the
death sentence. In two-thirds of the cases in which the judge over-
rides the jury's recommendation of life, the Florida Supreme Court
disagrees.158 In seventeen of the twenty-four cases in which the
Florida Supreme Court has affirmed a trial judge's override, at
least one Justice of the Florida Supreme Court has dissented. 59 In
156. This usually does not happen. See Brief of Petitioner, appendix B, Spaziano v.
Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984) (of 85 reported overrides, the jury vote was known in only 25
cases).
157. SpinkeUink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 605 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979).
158. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
159. The Florida Supreme Court has approved overrides in twenty-four cases. Seventeen
of these cases contained dissents on the override issue. See Eutzy v. State, 458 So. 2d 755
(Fla. 1984) (McDonald, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2062 (1985); Parker v. State,
458 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1984) (McDonald, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. CL 1855 (1985);
Groover v. State, 458 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1984) (McDonald, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S.
CL 1877 (1985); Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1984) (Overton and McDonald, JJ.,
dissenting); Heiney v. State, 447 So. 2d 210 (Fla 1984) (Boyd and McDonald, JJ., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 303 (1984); Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038 (Fla.) (Overton and
McDonald, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 303 (1984); Stevens v. State, 419 So. 2d
1058 (Fla. 1982) (McDonald and Overton, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228
(1983); Miller v. State, 415 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1982) (McDonald and Overton, JJ., dissenting),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1158 (1983); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981) (England, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981)
(Sundberg and England, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); Johnson v.
State, 393 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1980) (Sundberg, McDonald, and Overton, JJ., dissenting), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); Hoy v. State, 353 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 920 (1978); Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977) (Hatch-
ett, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978); Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
1976) (England, J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Douglas v.
State, 328 So. 2d 18 (Fla.) (England, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); Saw-
yer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1975) (Ervin and Boyd, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 428
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virtually every case in which the Florida Supreme Court has up-
held the jury override, there has been at least one possible mitigat-
ing circumstance evident from the face of published opinions.160
U.S. 911 (1976); Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1975) (Ervin and Boyd, JJ., dissent-
ing), affd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
160. See Heiney v. Florida, 105 S. Ct. 303, 304 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari) (doubt about guilt) (denying certiorari from Heiney v. State, 447 So. 2d
210 (Fla. 1984)); Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038, 1045 (Overton, J., dissenting) ("The jury
could have reasonably believed the appellant's testimony that he had been threatened by
the victim and feared for his life."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 229 (1984); Routly v. State, 440
So. 2d 1257, 1266 (Fla. 1983) (domestic difficulties; girlfriend left defendant and spent the
night with victim; possible mitigating circumstances of age of defendant, lack of prior signif-
icant criminal activity and extreme emotional disturbance), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3591
(1984); Porter v. State, 429 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla.) (possible mitigating circumstances of age,
marital and parental status, lack of significant history of prior criminal activity and employ-
ment history), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983); Bolander v. State, 422 So. 2d 833, 837
(Fla. 1982) (disparity between sentences received by defendant and codefendant; weakness
of evidence of guilt which was based on testimony of codefendant), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2111 (1983); Stevens v. State, 419 So. 2d 1058, 1065 (Fla. 1982) (McDonald, J., dissenting)
("The jury could have concluded that Stevens participated in the robbery and rape, but that
[the codefendant] was the sole perpetrator of the homicide."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228
(1983); Miller v. State, 415 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1982) (McDonald, J., dissenting) (The
homicide was "the culmination of a drug and alcohol infested party .... A psychologist
testified that Miller [had] a weak ego, that he [was] a 'follower,' that he [was] whatever his
environment [dictated]."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1158 (1983); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d
943, 953 (Fla. 1981) (doubt about guilt), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); White v. State,
403 So. 2d 331, 339-40 (Fla. 1981) (defendant was an accomplice in a capital felony commit-
ted by another and his participation was rather minor); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 376
(Fla. 1981) ("The evidence establishes .. . [t]he Defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity."), cert. denied, 455 US. 1035 (1982); McCrae v. State, 395 So. 2d
1145, 1155 (Fla. 1980) (doctor testified that defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance at the time the crimes were committed), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1041 (1981); Johnson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1069, 1075 (Sundberg, J., dissenting) ("There
is nothing about the actual homicide itself to set it apart from the norm of murders-a
single gunshot to the chest with death ensuing instantly. [And]. . .the fusillade of pistol
shots [was] initiated by the victim."); id. at 1076 (McDonald, J., dissenting) ('The victim
initiated the shooting.... The testimony of the psychologist could lead one to believe that
the defendant's apparent malevolent act against the victim was in fact an unplanned reac-
tion to being fired at."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433,
435-36 (Fla. 1976) (a period of mental stress preceeding the homicide); id. at 444 n.* (Eng-
land, J., dissenting) ("[B]y imposing and discussing the basis for consecutive sentences the
trial judge anticipated the possibility that reasonable people could differ with him."), af'd
on other grounds, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Hoy v. State, 353 So. 2d 826, 833 (Fla. 1977) (sen-
tencing judge found defendant's age and lack of prior criminal activity to be mitgating fac-
tors) (Governor and Cabinet subsequently commuted sentence to life), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 420 (1977); Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1271 (Fla. 1977) (age), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 892 (1978); Douglas v. State, 328 So. 2d 18, 18 (love triangle in which defendant had
prior relationship with victim's wife and lived with her from time to time), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 871 (1976); Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680, 680-81 (Fla. 1975) (unintentional killing in
the course of a robbery to support a two-hundred dollar per day heroin habit) (Governor
and Cabinet subsequently commuted sentence to life), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976);
Gardner v. State, 313 So. 2d 675, 678-79 (Fla. 1975) (Ervin, J., dissenting) (husband
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Unless one is willing to conclude that majorities of various juries,
numerous circuit judges and all the justices of the Florida Supreme
Court are not "reasonable persons," their differing conclusions in
capital cases militate against any reasonable person accepting the
validity of the Tedder standard.
IX. SYMMETRY BETWEEN LIFUE OVERRIDES AND DEATH OVERRIDES
The Florida capital sentencing scheme which allows the trial
judge to override a jury's recommendation of a life sentence also
allows the judge to override the jury's recommendation of a death
sentence. Given that the jury is the best calibrator of retribution,
the issue which presents itself is whether the judge should be em-
powered to override the jury's recommendation of the death sen-
tence. To disallow the override of a jury recommendation of life or
death would render Florida's system similar to that employed in
thirty other states, simply a scheme of jury sentencing. 16 1
This issue surfaced during the hearings on HB 820 proposing a
repeal of the jury override prompting the following exchange:
Mr. McEwan: Senator, I understand this bill, and I understand
where you're coming from, but if the [jury] recommends mercy or
life imprisonment, then the [judge] has to grant that. But if the
jury recommends death, he doesn't have to go by that.
Senator [Dunn]: That's right.
Mr. McEwan: Philosophically, where are we coming from? Let's
put it in there that the judge, that the jury says death, there will
be death. Do you mean, do you see a problem with that, I have
trouble with that ....
Life's life, but death can be life also.
Senator Dunn: I would be very happy to see that. Because I think
that has a symmetry to it that is appealing.
The problem... with it is that as everyone that I know who
has read Furman has come to the conclusion that you have to
have a superintendent authority to intervene between that deter-
mination by the jury that death is appropriate in a given case. In
other words, you have to have that judge be able to intervene.
murders wife in context of alcoholism and marital tension), vacated on other grounds, 430
U.S. 349 (1977).
161. See supra note 7.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
You don't have to have it for the other side.16 2
Despite Senator Dunn's conclusion, a jury sentencing statute
would pass constitutional muster, providing that the jury made
specific findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that
the Florida Supreme Court conducted a proportionality review,
that the courts retained their inherent power to correct legal errors
occurring at the sentencing proceeding, and that unanimity was re-
quired for death sentences.16 3 Such a statute has withstood United
States Supreme Court scrutiny,"" and jury sentencing is the pre-
dominant method of sentencing in states which administer the
death penalty.1 65
While a judge's decision to impose a life sentence when the jury
has recommended death is constitutional under the present Flor-
ida system, the inquiry as to the advisability of such a practice
remains. It is the position of this Article that the death override
serves an important purpose and should not be rejected. As one
commentator, apparently generally in favor of the death penalty,
has noted: "permitting a judge to reject death and grant life is jus-
tified. The community sometimes becomes inflamed on debatable
facts, and raises the hue and cry for vengeance. The judge should
be permitted to act as a detached overseer to restrain passion-
numbed judgments." 16 Such reasoning is generally proffered in
favor of retaining the death override. When the Florida Supreme
Court first considered Florida's post-Furman statute, the court fo-
cused on the override provision solely in terms of the judge over-
riding a jury's recommendation of death. The court concluded that
"the inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer sentence a man to
die; the sentence is viewed in the light of judicial experience."167
This Article has previously concluded, however, that judges pos-
sess no special expertise on the issue of imposing the death penalty
and are less likely to embody the community sentiment that is at
162. Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 12-13.
163. Of the 30 states with jury sentencing, 23 explicitly provide for a sentence of life
imprisonment unless the jury unanimously votes for death. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 102-
19.
164. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1981)
(following jury verdict of death, judge shall sentence to death); Mason v. State, 222 S.E.2d
339 (Ga. 1976) (once jury has decided for death, actual act of judge sentencing is only minis-
terial act), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
165. See supra note 7.
166. Little, Another View, 36 U. FL& L. REv. 200, 204 (1984).
167. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
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the core of the death decision.' 8 Unfortunately, case histories and
statistics relevant to the issue of death override are not availa-
ble.'6 9 It is therefore very difficult to assess the number and type of
cases in which a judge either has overridden or will override a
jury's recommendation. The judge must make written findings
when a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed despite a jury's
recommendation of death, but this order, unlike an order imposing
the death sentence, is not directly appealable to the Florida Su-
preme Court.170
Allowing judges to override death sentences, but not life
sentences, and effectively insulating the judge's death override
from appellate review, would apparently create an irrational asym-
metry in the system. Such inequality would be intolerable if the
criminal justice system were an abstractly rational system. It is
not.
The foundation of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence is ex-
pressed in the words of the sixteenth-century jurist, Sir John
Fortescue: "Indeed, I would much rather that twenty guilty per-
sons should escape the punishment of death than that one inno-
cent person should be condemned, and suffer capitally.'' 1  The
system is one which presumes one is innocent until proven guilty
and not one in which a person possesses no presumptions and must
be proven either guilty or innocent.
While the existence of a death override without a similar provi-
sion for a life override creates an asymmetry, it is "an asymmetry
weighted on the side of mercy."' 7 2 Such an "asymmetry is offen-
sive, however, only if one assumes that the grant of mercy to some,
168. See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
169. Justice Stevens noted in Spaziano that "[i]f there are any cases in which the jury
override procedure has worked to the defendant's advantage because the trial judge rejected
a jury's recommendation of death, they have not been brought to our attention by the At-
torney General of Florida, who would presumably be aware of any such cases." Spaziano v.
Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3171 n.14. (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). At the hearings on Fla.
HB 820 (1984), Chairperson Martinez told the committee that he had instructed his staff to
obtain information on death overrides but that "[i]t's not easily available. It's going to al-
most require the (Sitate [A]ttorneys going through their files and their cases .... " See
Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 15.
170. Capital cases are appealed automatically to the Florida Supreme Court. FL& STAT. §
921.141(4) (1983).
171. J. FoRTEscus., DE LAuDrnus LEGUM ANGLAE 45 (F. Grigor trans. 1917). See gener-
ally Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53
So. CA!. L REv. 1143 (1980); Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L Rav. 989 (1978).
172. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 960 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2667
(1984).
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based on their particularized circumstances, somehow abridges the
constitutional rights of others whose particular circumstances do
not inspire mercy. 1 "73 Asymmetry in the death penalty has been
declared constitutionally viable in the context of limiting aggravat-
ing circumstances to those enumerated in the statute while al-
lowing mitigating circumstances to include any circumstance,
whether listed by the statute or not.17'4 Similarly, in the guilt phase
of capital cases as well as in noncapital cases, a judge may enter a
judgment of acquittal despite the jury's rendition of a guilty ver-
dict,1 7 5 but there is no provision allowing a judge to adjudicate a
defendant guilty where the jury has rendered a verdict of not
guilty. This fundamental principal should be extended to the pen-
173. Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1376 n.57 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 949 (1982).
174. The Florida Supreme Court has held that "aggravating circumstances enumerated
in the statute... are exclusive; no others may be used for that purpose." Purdy v. State,
343 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.. 847 (1977); see also Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d
882, 885 (Fla. 1979); Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Fla. 1977). Though this principle
is not required by the United States Constitution, Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3424-
25 (1983), it appears to be firmly established law in Florida. By contrast, the federal Consti-
tution does mandate that the capital sentencer be permitted to consider and give indepen-
dent mitigating weight to any relevant mitigating circumstance, even if not enumerated in
the capital statute. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). See also supra note 47.
175. See supra note 151. One component of the jury's death decision could, consistent
with our argument, remain subject to review by the trial judge even under a "both ways
binding" system of jury sentencing. In the manner of a special verdict, the jury's determina-
tion of specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances could properly be scrutinized by
the court, since these, for the most part, refer to objectively ascertainable facts. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(a) (1983) (capital felony committed by person under sentence of
imprisonment); id. § 921.141(5)(b) (defendant previously convicted of another capital fel-
ony); id. § 921.141(5)(f) (capital felony committed for pecuniary gain); but see id. §
921.141(5)(h) (capital felony "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"); Mello, supra note 58.
To the extent that judges have greater expertise in factfinding, the jury's findings of fact
against the defendant at the penalty phase should be subject to corrective action, as they
are at the guilt phase.
The findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances constitute only one step in the
death decision, however. Even if aggravating circumstances are found to exist, they must
still be weighed against mitigating circumstances to determine if death is the appropriate
penalty in the given case. It is here that the governing standard is moral and ethical, rather
than legal, and it is here that a single judge has no apparent competence to defy the judge-
ment of the community's representatives.
This bifurcation of the penalty determination could be implemented in several different
forms. For example, after the jury has rendered its verdict and specified the aggravating
circumstances it has found, the court could review those circumstances to determine if they
were supported by the record; if not, the judge would then require the jury to recommence
deliberations. A more efficient mechanism would be for the court to decide, in advance of
jury deliberations, which aggravating circumstances would be supported by the record and
then to instruct the jury on only those aggravating circumstances.
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alty phase.
Therefore, weighting the jury override in favor of life is not only
constitutionally permissible, but in accordance with the tenets of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is the life override that is the
historical anomaly.
X. TINKERING WITH THE STATUTE
An ostensible legislative and gubernatorial anxiety is that any
changes to the death penalty statute would render the statute's
constitutional validity questionable. The offices of the Florida At-
torney General, various State's Attorneys and the Governor have
argued that any "tinkering with the statute" is inadvisable and
would generate challenges by Death Row inmates.lM The saying "if
it ain't broken, don't fix it" is popular in the Florida legislature. 17
The problem with applying this homily to the death penalty stat-
ute is that legislators equate constitutionality with perfection. Im-
perfect statutes may be constitutional, but that is an insufficient
justification for failing to improve a statute, especially when that
statute governs who shall die.
A. The History of the Override
Florida's statutory provision that a judge may override the life
sentence recommendation of a jury is not based upon any judg-
ment, either legislative or judicial, that the override serves an im-
portant state interest. Rather, the override is a product of the
state's misapprehension that it was required by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia. 75 The Furman
decision consists of a terse per curiam disposing of the cases at bar,
followed by nine separate opinions of the individual Justices. 7 9 No
Justice in the five-person majority joined in the opinion of any
other. Furman continues to engender confusion and to provide fer-
176. See Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 16 (statement of Mr. Arnold) (asking,
"[will repeal] create another avenue of appeal? I suspect it will, or will it automatically take
them off of Death Row?"); id. at 20 (statement of Mr. Stone) (arguing that repeal would
give rise to equal protection and due process challenges by all death-sentenced inmates); id.
at 24 (statement of Mr. Weidinger, representing Governor Graham) (endorsing remarks of
Mr. Stone).
177. Compare id. at 2 (testimony of Senator Dunn) ("I think it is broke and therefore
needs to be fixed.").
178. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
179. See generally Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972
Sup. CT. Ray. 1 (analyzing the separate opinions in Furman).
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tile material for commentators."' 0
The statutes at issue in Furman were held unconstitutional be-
cause they lacked standards to distinguish who should live from
who should not. The Court rejected capital systems that facilitated
arbitrariness. Justices Brennan and Marshall would have held the
death penalty per se unconstitutional. 181 Justices Stewart and
White reasoned that arbitrariness voided the capital punishment
statutes before the Court.182 Justice Douglas stressed that the evil
that inheres in a standardless system is that it encourages
sentencers to give legal and irremedial effect to their race, class,
and other prejudices.183 Where the law grants unfettered discre-
tion, it is not surprising that such discretion will be exercised by
the powerful against the less powerful, including the poor and mi-
norities. Florida's override was passed in direct response to the di-
verse concerns expressed in the various Furman opinions.
At the time of Furman, Florida was in the process of amending
its 1872 capital punishment law which for the previous century had
entrusted juries to make the determination whether or not to im-
pose the death sentence. Furman created much confusion in Flor-
ida, as elsewhere, and the two houses of the Florida legislature di-
vided sharply on the appropriate response to the Supreme Court's
opinions.'" The Florida Senate interpreted Furman as requiring
jury consideration of statutorily enumerated aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, followed by jury rendition of an advisory
opinion reached by majority vote. Under the Senate's scheme, a
verdict for life imprisonment would be binding, but a verdict for
the death penalty would be subject to the judge's override.118
The Governor, Attorney General, and Florida House of Repre-
180. See, e.g., Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. Rxv. 305, 315 (Furman "is
not so much a case as a badly orchestrated opera, with nine characters taking turns to offer
their own arias."); id. at 317 ("In the manner of literary criticism, one can extract unifying
'themes' in the Furman opinions .... ").
181. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
182. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
184. The Florida Legislature responded to Furman by enacting its new statute in a mat-
ter of frenetic days at a Special Session in late November and early December 1972. The act
was approved by the Governor on December 8 and took effect immediately. Florida thus
became the first state to enact a post-Furman capital statute. See generally Ehrhardt &
Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility? 64 J. Czm. L
& CRMMOLOGY 10 (1973); Note, Florida's Legislative and Judicial Responses to Furman v.
Georgia: An Anaylsis and Criticism, 2 Ft& ST. UL Rav. 108 (1974).
185. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 184, at 15.
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sentatives interpreted Furman differently. According to the House
Bill, the jury would be entirely excluded from the penalty phase.18 6
Faced with such opposing views, a conference committee formu-
lated a compromise which became the law of the state.187 This final
version included aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the
jury's rendition of an advisory sentence which the judge could
override in favor of either life or death.8 8
At least one legislator privy to that confusion now believes that
the judge's override in favor of death was a mistake.18 9 Although
the Florida Supreme Court has perpetuated that mistake by opin-
ing that "allowing the jury's recommendation to be binding would
violate Furman,"'90 the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that "sentencing by the trial judge certainly is not required
by Furman""'l and that "[niothing in any of [the Court's] cases
suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy
violates the Constitution."" 2 Furman invalidated prior sentencing
schemes because they allowed the sentencer unbridled discretion
to impose death and not because they allowed the jury discretion
to extend mercy.
186. Id. at 14.
187. Id. at 15. Senator Dunn, one of the drafters of the resulting statute, described the
conference committee thusly:
We went to Conference Committee and I can remember to this day that Confer-
ence Committee going to about one-thirty or two o'clock in the morning. I remem-
ber talking to some of the members of the Senate whom I respect today and did
then, and some of them are still in the Senate. And going out in the hall and I
remember one of them asking me, do you really think it is better to go to judges as
opposed to the jury. No, we don't. We think we have to because Furman requires
it. What we sat down or really at that point stood there and worked out was a
compromise, a cross if you will, a hybrid between what was done in the Senate
version and the House version. And that cross was the utilization of the jury as a
recommending authority on the question of the ultimate sentence.
-.. The question to me from the [S]enator was, well how do we try to make the
consistent role of the, how we try to make the role of the jury consistent with the
tradition in this state? And frankly, we found no way to do it. At that time, we
were of the opinion that we had to have symmetry in the system, that we had to
have [a] consistent role of the judge and the jury, that we had to therefore permit
a judge to overturn a recommended sentence of mercy by the jury.
Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 5-6.
188. See FLA. STAT. ch. 921 (1973).
189. Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 6 (testimony of Senator Dunn).
190. Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508, 512 (Fla. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct.
3154 (1984); Johnson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1069, 1074 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882
(1981); Douglas v. State, 373 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1979).
191. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3164 n.8
192. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
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B. Effect of the Override's Repeal
Even assuming that Florida legislators recognize that the over-
ride provision of the capital statute was passed due to a misappre-
hension of constitutional requirements and assuming further that
these legislators are convinced that allowing a judge to override a
jury's recommendation of life is inconsistent with a criminal justice
system weighted in favor of mercy, legislators express genuine con-
cern about the practical impact of repeal of the override.19 This
concern is focused upon the effect of the override's repeal upon the
persons sentenced to death during the life override's tenure.
Those inmates whose juries recommended the death penalty and
who were thereafter accordingly sentenced to death by the trial
judge would have no apparent status to object to the amendment.
The present death-recommended inmates would be in no worse a
position after repeal of the life override.
The effect of repeal on the seventeen inmates who presently re-
side on Death Row because a judge overrode a jury's recommenda-
tion of a life sentence, and whose death sentences have been af-
firmed by the Florida Supreme Court, is more problematic. This
issue was debated seriously during the hearings on House Bill 820,
which proposed repeal of the life override. The legal issue centered
around the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws.194
While it is clear that the ex post facto clause only bars changes
that work to the disadvantage of criminal defendants and that the
clause only precludes modifications in substantive law and not
changes in procedural law,"9 ' the testimony on House Bill 820 con-
flicted on the issue of whether the override was properly catego-
rized as substantive or procedural. State Attorney for the Nine-
teenth Judicial Circuit, Robert Stone, expressed his concern for
the then twelve inmates on Death Row (following Florida Supreme
Court affirmance) due to a life override thusly:
There is no question in my mind that the United States Su-
preme Court would immediately commute those sentences to
life.... [Wihat would be more substantive than life or death[?]
You can call it procedure if you want to, but it's substantive, let's
face it. What they would say is, that now in Florida there is a
class of people 96 that are not being sentenced to death, and yet
193. Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 15-16 (remarks of Representative Arnold).
194. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10.
195. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292-93 (1977).
196. These inmates would appear not to have a valid claim based on the equal protec-
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you're taking twelve people who were not given this opportunity
prior to passing this law and I submit that a federal court would
immediately commute those sentences to life. They would have
good grounds to. No question about it.
1 9
Senator Dunn, a supporter of the repeal of the life override as well
as a supporter of the death penalty, testified to the contrary:
In my opinion, this would not affect retroactively the convic-
tions of anyone for the reason that really this is a procedural mat-
ter, number one, and in my judgment is not substantive. It is a
procedure where substantive rights are determined. Next, I would
suggest to you that the problem, and there is a serious problem as
to how you deal with those individuals, I think the only avenue is
executive clemency. I think the Governor would have a tough
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. The equal protection analysis turns on whether
the right to life in this context is deemed a fundamental right, and so the state must justify
its action by a compelling state interest. One commentator has argued that "[allthough the
court has not so held, it is axiomatic that no right is more fundamental than the right to
life .... Although not stated in these terms, this is the import of the major death penalty
decisions.. . ." Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CalM. L & CmMI-
NOLOGY 786, 802 & n.102 (1983) (citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339
N.E.2d 676, 678-79 (Mass 1975). Notably, Professor Goodpaster's article apparently was
prepared prior to the capital cases decided at the end of the 1982 Term. See supra notes 14-
17. These were eighth amendment cases, but in the capital punishment setting the two ap-
pear intertwined. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 891 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(noting "analytical nexus between Eighth Amendment claims and a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim") (citations omitted), petition for cert. filed, No. 84-6811 (U.S. May
28, 1985). Further, the fundamental rights argument may simply prove too much. Adoption
of this analysis by the Court could make it unlikely that any capital statute could survive
constitutional attack. The Court's death penalty doctrine is clearly moving in the opposite
direction.
Assuming a fundamental right is not impinged, the state could meet its burden by show-
ing that the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. In Fra-
zier v. Manson, 703 F.2d 30 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 339 (1983), for example, the
court held that a statute increasing "good time credit" only after a specified date did not
violate equal protection by improperly discriminating against persons sentenced prior to
that date. The court reasoned that the legislative classification could be justified by "the
avoidance of encroachment by the legislature on the judiciary's sentencing authority." Id. at
35.
"States are certainly free to amend their sentencing laws and, having done so, they are
not required to apply them retroactively to persons who have been validly sentenced under
the law as it previously existed." United States ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Parole and Probation
Board, 669 F.2d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982). The enactment of
ameliorative legislation has not been held to "arrest or interfere" with the execution of a
finalized sentence. Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (citations omit-
ted). But see Ham v. North Carolina, 471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973). See generally Comment,
Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal
Legislation, 121 U. PA. L REv. 120 (1972).
197. Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 19.
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time, but I believe they were convicted under the law ... and
they ought to be given the judgment of the law as it existed at
that time and still exists, I would say [it] would not affect them at
all. What we're looking for is prospective application.19
The law supports Senator Dunn's conclusion that an amendment
repealing the override would not create an ex post facto law. First,
repeal of the override is not a change that operates to disadvantage
defendants. Second, the amendment is a change in procedural law.
In Dobbert v. Florida,199 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered a challenge to a death sentence based upon the ex post facto
clause. At the time Dobbert committed his crimes, Florida did not
have a constitutional death penalty statute.20 0 Several months after
Dobbert's offense, Florida enacted the statute that was upheld in
Proffitt v. Florida.0 1 Dobbert was sentenced to die under the new
statute. The Court upheld Dobbert's sentence, reasoning that:
"Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a
procedural change is not ex post facto. . . . [T]he change in the
statute was clearly procedural. The new statute simply altered the
methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was
to be imposed . . .., Similarly, the repeal of the judge's power
to override a jury's recommendation of a life sentence would be a
procedural change in the statute and thus not subject to a consti-
tutional challenge under the ex post facto clause.
Again, however, constitutionality should not be equated with
perfection. There is nothing to prevent the Florida legislature from
explicitly making the amendment retroactive in application. 03 The
198. Id. at 16.
199. 432 U.S. 282 (1979).
200. Dobbert allegedly committed his crimes in 1971. Florida's capital statute was invali-
dated by Furman one year later.
201. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
202. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94.
203. The political prospects do not, however, appear promising. Fla. SB 940 (1985) pro-
vided that repeal of the life override would "apply only to offenses committed on or after
January 1, 1986" and that "[p]ersons who committed a capital felony prior to such date
shall be sentenced in accordance with the law in effect at the time the [offense] was commit-
ted." Id. sec. 2. The bill further provided: "It is the intent of the Legislature that the
amendments.. . shall not constitute grounds for appeal of a sentence for an offense com-
mitted before January 1, 1986 nor constitute grounds to apply for executive clemency or any
other form of post-conviction relief." Id. sec. 2(2).
The legislature's authority to restrict clemency in this way rests on shaky constitutional
ground. Clemency in Florida flows from a "self-executing constitutional provision" which
vests "sole, unrestricted, unlimited discretion exclusively in the executive in exercising this
act of grace." Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
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spector of actually executing those override inmates whose death
sentences have been affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court coun-
sels against making repeal prospective only. We believe that pro-
spective repeal would be unwise and unfair, but not
unconstitutional.
The "tinkering with the statute" argument against repealing the
jury override fails to account for previous amendments to the
death penalty statute. In 1979, the legislature added a subsection
to the capital sentencing statute making it an aggravating circum-
stance if the offense was "committed in a cold, calculated and pre-
meditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justifica-
tion. ' 20 4 The legislature also amended the statute to delete
language suggesting that mitigating circumstances were restricted
to those enumerated in the statute.2 0 6
More importantly, however, the "tinkering with the statute" po-
sition fails to account for the duty of legislators to address a grave
defect in the law governing the most awesome exercise of state
power over the life of a citizen. Senator Dunn testified concerning
this obligation:
I don't think we can turn our backs to the problem of unreliabil-
ity in the system as we now have it.
We can't turn our backs for this reason, really for two reasons.
The supreme court has held that "an attempt on the part of the Legislature to exercise any
part of the pardoning power would be in conflict with the Constitution." Id. at 316. Simi-
larly, the legislature's felt need to limit legal and judicially-cognizable issues seems unneces-
sary. The Florida Constitution provides that the repeal or amendment of a criminal statute
shall not affect the prosecution or punishment of any crime previously committed. See FLA.
CONsT. art. X, § 9; Helmig v. State, 330 So. 2d 246 (FIa 1st DCA 1976).
204. Ch. 79-353, 1979 Fla. Laws 1828 (codified at FL. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i) (1979)). The
Florida Supreme Court upheld this aggravating circumstance against an ex post facto chal-
lenge in Combs v. State, 403 So. 2d 418, 420-21 (Fin. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984
(1982). In some sense the statutory addition was already a part of the elements of the crime
for which Combs was being tried. But the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that sim-
ple premeditation cannot qualify under the new aggravating factor; there must be a greater
level of premeditation, a more methodical intent. See, e.g., King v. State, 436 So. 2d 50, 55
(Fla. 1983); Washington v. State, 432 So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1690
(1984); McCray v. State, 416 So. 2d 804, 807 (Fla. 1982). A state cannot use an element of
the underlying capital felony as an aggravating circumstance justifying the death sentence,
because the constitutional function of an aggravating circumstance is to "genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. . . ." Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733,
2742-43 (1983). For this reason, an aggravating circumstance cannot merely duplicate an
element of the crime itself. See Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985).
205. Ch. 79-353, 1979 Fla. Laws 1827 (codified at F& STAT. § 921.141(2)(b), (3)(b)
(1979)). See Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and
the Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. Rav. 317, 355 n.185
(1981).
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Number one, it's not moral, it's not ethical, it's not honorable for
us not to attend to the system when we know, we have reason to
know, that it's not working right in that particular. We have a
duty as legislators in my opinion to fix that part of the system
because we ought to know from statistics alone that it's not right.
We ought to know when we compare the eighty-two cases in Flor-
ida with what is being done throughout the country,' that some-
thing's awry in Florida.... Now, I don't subscribe to the pro-
position that the standard enunciated by the Florida Supreme
Court is even working. It obviously isn't working.
The second reason that I think we need to address this ques-
tion [is that] [t]hose of us, myself included, who support capital
punishment, have a duty to assure that it is implemented fairly
and impartially and that we have done all in our power to re-
spond to those other people who do not like capital punishment,
who think we have blood on our hands, to be honorable in the
performance of our duty either as legislators, or in the executive
branch .... 200
Thus, at least one proponent of capital punishment believes that
the statute is in fact "broken" and worth "fixing."
X1 CONCLUSION
The provision of Florida's capital sentencing statute which al-
lows a circuit judge to override a jury's recommendation of a life
sentence and results in the imposition of a death sentence and re-
sulting execution should be amended by the Florida legislature. Al-
though the override has been upheld as constitutional by the
United States Supreme Court, policy considerations militate
against retaining it. The override results in a debasement of the
jury's role as the proper reflection of community sentiment. The
override is costly in terms of governmental efficiency and monetary
resources. The override increases the likelihood that an innocent
person may be executed and is inconsistent with a judicial system
that is weighted in favor of mercy. The problems caused by the
override cannot be cured by appellate review, although such
problems can be cured by legislative action. Legislative repeal of
the power of a judge to override a jury's recommendation of life is
within the province, duty and ethical obligation of Florida
legislators.
206. See Unofficial Transcript, supra note 75, at 7-8.
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